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INTRODUCTION

Health maintenance organizations (HMOs) may be defined as institutions that both insure and provide health care services to a voluntarily enrolled population in exchange for prepaid per capita payments.,
HMOs have become a small but viable sector of the medical economy
and are potentially significant vehicles for controlling health care
costs. 2 This form of organization appears capable of providing medical
care more efficiently than fee-for-service providers and insurers 3 and
should therefore exert significant competitive pressure on the fee-forservice sector.' HMOs also may threaten noneconomic interests of feefor-service physicians because of the HMOs' different goals and innovative methods of delivering health services.' These factors, together
with the history of organized medicine's opposition to HMOs, 6 suggest
1. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, HEALTH MAINTETOWARD A FAIR MARKET TEST 2-3 (1974).
2. Havighurst, ControllingHealth Care Costs; Strengtheningthe Private Sector's Hand, 1 J.
HEALTH POL., PoL'Y & L. 471,489 (1977); see FTC REPORT, Havighurst, HMO, Note, The Role
of PrepaidGroup Practicein Relieving the MedicalCare Crisis, 84 HARV. L. REv. 887 (1971). The
first HMOs, as defined in the text accompanying note I supra, were established in 1929. See W.
MACCOLL, GROUP PRACTICE AND PREPAYMENT OF MEDICAL CARE 20-21 (1966); HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS: SUMMARY OF FY 1975 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1975). By 1965 there were
-approximately 20 HMOs serving 1.5 million subscribers, id 5, and today there are more than 170
HMOs serving over 6 million people. Letter from Frank H. Seubold, Director, Division of
Health Maintenance Organizations, HEW, to Philip Kissam (July 25, 1977).
3. For a discussion of the theoretical reasons for HMOs' greater efficiency, see Auger &
Goldberg, PrepaidHealth PlansandMoral Hazara 22 PUB. POL'Y 353, 356-58 (1974). For summaries of empirical studies comparing HMOs' economic performance with that of the fee-forservice sector, see Donabedian, An Evaluationof PrepaidGroup Practice, 6 INQUIRY, Sept. 1969,
at 3; Roemer & Shonick, HMO Performance: The Recent Evidence, 51 MILBANK MEMORIAL
FUND Q. 271 (1973).
4. See FTC REPORT 16-138; Havighurst, HMOs 743-47; Havighurst, Speculations on the
Market's Futurein Health Care,in REGULATING HEALTH FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION 249, 256-65
(C. Havighurst ed. 1974); J. B. CmuSTIANSON, Do HMOs STIMULATE COMPETITION? (1978)
(available from Interstudy, P.O. Box S, Excelsior, Minn. 55331).
5. On the different nature of HMOs' goals and methods and the ways in which noneconomic
interests of fee-for-service physicians may be threatened by them, see text accompanying notes 1617 infra
6. See Kessel, PriceDiscriminationin Medicine, 1 J.L. & ECON. 20, 32-42 (1958); Rayack,
Restrictive Practicesof Organized Medicine, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 659, 677-97, 711-12 (1968);
Note, supranote 2, at 954-75.
NANCE ORGANIZATIONS:
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that HMO development may continue to face a variety of anticompetitive restraints from fee-for-service physicians and their allies.'
The purpose of this Article is to examine the role that antitrust law
might play in protecting HMO development from unfair resistance by
fee-for-service interests. Part II of the Article'is prologue, which examines the basic nature of the HMO threat to others and the history of
conflicts between HMOs and the fee-for-service sector. Part III analyzes the jurisdictional and substantive issues that will be raised by antitrust litigation designed to protect HMOs from anti-competitive
behavior. The consistent theme of this analysis is that antitrust law appears to have a useful but limited role to play in protecting HMOs from
such behavior. Significant limits appear likely because of three related
factors. The first is the intricate set of economic and political relationships among health care providers and insurers, to which all HMOs,
but particularly newer and smaller ones, are bound. These relationships may make much anti-HMO behavior difficult to detect. The second is the political power of organized medicine and its institutional
allies, which not only may be employed to obtain legislation that restricts HMO development but also helps support the prevailing ideological orientation of physicians toward personal autonomy, care of the
individual patient, and technological and scientific advances. This orientation may make it difficult for HMO-associated physicians to obtain
hospital staff privileges, prestigious medical school appointments and,
more generally, professional and social acceptance by their peers, even
in the absence of organized efforts to exclude HMO physicians from
desirable resources. The third limit-causing factor is the substantial
number of antitrust defenses and exemptions that seem available to
place much anticompetitive behavior toward HMOs beyond the reach
of antitrust law.8
7. Empirical evidence about the extent to which these restraints exist is admittedly sparse.
Several explanations for this sparsity may be offered. One is the relative newness of many HMOs

and of much of the relevant regulatory legislation. Another could be the relative difficulty of
detecting these restraints (including unwillingness of HMOs and their physicians to report, see text
accompanying notes 123-24 infra). Still another explanation, as Professor Pauly of Northwestern
University suggested in commenting on a draft of this Article, is that HMOs in general have not
presented a true economic threat to the fee-for-service sector, thus obviating the need for re-

straints. He also suggested that if restraints were widespread, there should be more "smoking
guns." This latter argument may discount unduly, however, the role of professional attitudes in
helping obscure anti-HMO conspiracies. See text accompanying notes 77-124 infra.
8. The primary focus of this Article is on antitrust litigation, but the factors mentioned in the

text suggest that broader consideration of public law as well as private restraints on HMOs will be
necessary if HMOs are to be allowed to develop fully as a competitive force within the health care
industry. The basic legislative policy issues pertaining to HMOs already have been examined in
depth from an "antitrust point of view." See, e.g., INSTITuTE OF MEDICINE, supranote I; Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilitiesand Services by "Cerlticateof Need," 59 VA.L. Rlv. 1143,
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INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Competitive Characteristicsof HMOs.

Several characteristics of HMOs create the possibility that HMOs
as a group will constitute a substantial threat to fee-for-service providers and insurers.9 First, the HMO's distinctive integration of insurance
and provider functions results in an organization operating with a
budget that is largely fixed in advance. This creates much stronger
incentives to deliver services economically than any that exist in the
fee-for-service sector, and in fact certain well-established HMOs have
shown a marked ability to reduce substantially the total costs of medical care to consumers.10 HMOs also may encourage more comprehensive and integrated provision of services in order to take advantage of
economies of scale and of integration. Thus, both economic theory
and empirical studies suggest that HMOs can be relatively efficient entrants into health care markets. In any event, new HMOs have tended
to enter markets that are experiencing the most rapid increases in
12
health care costs and insurance premiums.
Second, HMOs also may take business from other providers and
insurers because of certain quality improvements that could result from
their unique financial and organizational structure. 13 For example, attempts by HMOs to reduce surgery and drug costs should help focus
attention of HMO physicians on the problem of eliminating unnecessary surgery and drug prescriptions. 4 Similarly, HMO physicians, at
least those who are paid on a salaried or profit-sharing basis, should
have less incentive than fee-for-service physicians to refrain from referrals or consultations, since HMO physicians stand to lose less income
1204-15 (1973); Havighurst & Bovbjerg, ProfessionalStandardsReview Organizationsand Health
Maintenance Organizations;Are They Compatible?,1975 UTAH L. REv. 381. See also Kissam &
Johnson, FederalHMO Laws, Kissam & Johnson, State HMO Laws.
9. The following discussion is based in part on a summary of the literature about HMO
performance in Kissam & Johnson, FederalHMO Laws 1167-83.
10. See M. ROEMER, HEALTH INSURANCE EFFEcTs: SERVICES, EXPENDITURES AND AmrITuDEs 3-8, 43-49 (1972); Donabedian, supra note 3, at 16-17; Roemer & Shonick, supra note 3, at
294-95.
11. See Auger & Goldberg, supra note 3, at 358; Roemer & Shonick, supra note 3, at 301.
12. See McNeil & Schlenker, HMOs, Competition and Government, 53 MILBANK MEMORIAL
FUND Q. 195, 200-01 (1975).
13. The quality improvements discussed here may be distinguished conceptually from other
quality improvements-for example, more comprehensive services--that HMOs are able to offer
because of their more efficient performance.
14. For surveys of the kinds and estimated amounts of harmful, unnecessary surgery and
drug prescriptions in this country, see Brody, Incompetent Surgery Is FoundNot Isolatea N.Y.
Times, Jan. 27, 1976, at 1, col. 6; Resberger, Thousands a Year Killed by FaultyPrescrfptions,

N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1976, at 1,col. 7.
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than their fee-for-service counterparts by making referrals or requesting consultations. If HMOs are able to communicate these and other
quality-of-care advantages effectively to potential subscribers,"5 they
would possess another effective economic weapon with which they
could threaten the fee-for-service sector.
Third, the HMO's basic concept or goal of considering quality/cost tradeoffs and certain methods used to implement this concept
may threaten the psychological well-being and social status of fee-forservice physicians. The "commercial" attitude of HMOs toward the
delivery of medical care may help "break down the myth of the priesthealer." 16 In other words, the emphasis of HMOs on clinical forms of
medicine, mandatory second opinions and substantial delegation of
medical acts to nonphysicians could influence public attitudes about
the nature of appropriate medical practice. This process not only may
have economic ramifications (in terms of changing tastes and demand
for medical care) but also may damage physicians' sense of personal
security and their relative social position in the community. Similar
kinds of losses might also occur as a result of fee-for-service physicians
accepting more outside review of their work as part of their competitive
response to HMOs. Because of this psychosocial element in the HMO
threat, reactions to new HMOs by physician competitors may be
fiercely emotional, based on deeply-held individual beliefs of a moral
nature, and often disproportionate to the scale of the economic threat
that an HMO portends. This situation can result in anticompetitive
behavior that is difficult to detect and, if discovered, often may be beyond the reach of antitrust law.' 7
form may itself be used by fee-for-service
Significantly, the
providers and insurers in a preemptive or defensive manner to deter
entry by or to discipline more aggressive, independently-sponsored
HIMOs.' 8 Defensive HMOs are likely to set their premiums at entry
limiting levels and to recruit aggressively only among those groups that
are most likely to be attracted to competitive HMOs. Furthermore,
where these HMOs are arms of large, multi-market "monopolies" such
as Blue Cross or state medical societies, there may be particular incentives for them to engage in predatory pricing or promotion against an
15. Consumer ignorance or indifference and state legal restraints on HMO advertising would

appear to be the major obstacles to effective communication of this sort.
16. Kessel, Commentar, on the Papers,in REGULATING H aLTm FAcILrrIEs CONSTRUCTION
35 (C. Havighurst ed. 1974).
17. See text accompanying notes 105-13 infra.
18. See Havighurst, HMOs 759-77, 789; Havighurst, Speculations on the Market's Future in
Health Care, supranote 4, at 257-59.
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individual HMO trying to enter a single market. 19
B.

The HistoricalConfrontation.

Organized medicine's initial reaction to HMO development in the
1930s and 1940s was to condemn HMOs as a form of "unethical
medical practice" and to resist their development in a relatively open

and formal manner. The claim of unethical practice often included
the suspect charge that HMOs provided "unreasonable competition"
for physicians.20 Nonetheless, this claim does have a public interest
aspect that is not entirely without intuitive appeal. HMOs' particular
financial incentives arguably could produce certain kinds of over-econ-

omizing that are damaging to patients.21 Their emphasis upon clinical
medicine also may disrupt the traditional relationship of trust between
physician and patient that arguably is a significant factor in good quality care.22 Consumers' knowledge of medical care quality generally is
19. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 223-25 (2d ed. 1977). See text accompanying notes 219-22 infra. See also Areeda & Turner, PredatoryPricingandRelatedPracticesUnder
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 698-99 (1975).
Defensive use of HMOs seems most likely to occur in one of three forms. One is the "medical care foundation" (MCF) that is being established in rather substantial numbers by county
medical societies and largely in areas where other HMOs exist or threaten to develop. See R.
WETHERVILLE & J. NoRDBY,A CENSUS OF HMOs: JULY, 1975, 10 (1975); Kissam & Johnson,
FederalHMO Laws 1178 n.103. MCFs reimburse their participating physicians on a fee-forservice basis, subject to the total prepayments collected from subscribers. Typically, they are
open for participation by all physician members of a county medical society who agree to accept
various controls over their practice (such as maximum fees and claims and peer review) in serving
MCF subscribers. See Auger & Goldberg, supra note 3, at 361-63. This organizational form
differs dramatically from the closed-panel HMO, which typically employs physicians on a salaried
or profit-sharing basis and provides its services in physically integrated group practice facilities.
A second common type of defensive HMO may be those sponsored by Blue Shield and Blue
Cross plans ("the Blues") in order to protect their relatively sizeable shares of private health insurance markets. See J.KRIZAY & A. WILSON, THE PATIENT As CONSUMER 3 (1974). Admittedly,
the Blues in some markets may be interested in using HMOs to regain customers from commercial
health insurers. In other areas, however, where the Blues still enjoy substantial market power and
good relations with their physician and hospital founders, the defensive motive may predominate.
See Goldberg & Greenberg, The Effect of Physician-ControlledHealth Insurance,2 J.HEALTH
POL., POL'Y & L. 48 (1977).
A third defensive type of HMO could be one established by a single or dominant hospital in a
relatively small city, with the purpose of serving a selected population that otherwise might enroll
in a more independent HMO. See Havighurst, HMOs 766-67. This kind of HMO, which presumably would be established with the consent if not the recommendation of the hospital's medical staff, would not be as threatening to fee-for-service providers as an aggressively expanding,
more independent HMO.
20. See, e.g., American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 238-40 n.23 (D.C. Cir.
1942), af4',317 U.S. 519 (1943). At the time of this suit the American Medical Association's
ethical standards allowed some forms of prepaid medical practice but not those that provided
"unreasonable competition" for physicians. Id
21. See Havighurst, HMOs 754-56.
22. See Klarman, Anaoysis of the HMO Proposal-Its Assumptions, Implications, and
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recognized to be too imperfect to allow consumers themselves to guard
against potential harms of these kinds. Therefore, the argument runs,
physicians who have the knowledge to protect consumers from inferior
quality care also have a professional duty to guard them from injury by
controlling prepaid medical practices. Although this argument may
have some lingering attractiveness,23 it seems deficient in that it ignores
a number of less restrictive constraints on HMOs that tend to minimize
the risks of poor quality care. Among these are medical malpractice
law, quality-of-care regulation by public agencies and the HMOs' need
to market insurance policies, which often will be purchased in effect by
employers or unions with resources to conduct their ow:i quality-ofcare assessments. 24
Fee-for-service physicians launched their attack on HMOs by employing three basic tactics: restrictive professional practices, the formation and use of physician-sponsored Blue Shield plans to deter or
discipline HMOs and the restrictive use of various state laws. This tale
of obstruction has been told well by others,25 but a review of its leading
themes will help suggest the kinds of anticompetitive behavior that
HMOs may continue to face and also will reveal some settled and unsettled questions of antitrust law.
1. Private Restraints. The Early Antitrust Cases. One early line
of defense thrown up by fee-for-service physicians consisted of restrictive professional practices that seemed likely to have a devastating effect upon HMO development. Specifically, early HMOs and their
physicians faced exclusion from county medical societies2 6 and hospital
pecft, in UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO CENTER FOR HEALTH ADMINISTRATION STUDIES,
HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS: A RECONFIGURATION OF THE HEALTH SERVICES SYSTEM 24, 33 (1971).
23. Compare the argument for an exemption from antitrust law for all forms of professional

self-regulation by lawyers in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,786-87 (1975), in which
the Supreme Court rejected the argument for an absolute exemption but did note that "It]he public service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice,
which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act, be treated differently." Id. at
788 n.17.
24. See Auger & Goldberg, supra note 3, at 390-91; Havighurst, HMOs 755-56.
25. See, eg., authorities cited in note 6 supra. On the use of Blue Shield plans to deter
HMOs as well as other forms of "objectionable" third party health insurance, see Competition in

the Health Services Market:HearingsBefore the Subcommr on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Conmn on the Judiciary,93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1076-77 (1974) (statement of Clark C. Havighurst); Goldberg & Greenberg, supra note 19; Havighurst, HtMOs 769-72.
26. See American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 529-33 (1943); Group Health
Coop. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 616, 625-27, 237 P.2d 737, 754, 758-59
(1951); ef United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 95 F. Supp. 103, 105, 109 (D. Or. 1950),
afd'a 343 U.S. 326 (1952) (exclusion from county medical societies of physicians cooperating with

commercial health insurers). The consequences to a physician of exclusion from a county medi-
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medical staffs,27 the refusal of fee-for-service physicians to consult with
or accept referrals from HMO physicians, 28 and the dissemination of
negative (and allegedly false) propaganda to the general public and
physicians about the nature of HMO operations. 29 These practices
were planned and conducted by organized groups of physicians, in particular state and county medical societies. A series of early cases con-

sidered the antitrust implications of these overt attempts to destroy
developing HMOs. While the holdings and analyses of these cases
have been discussed elsewhere, 30 it should be noted here that these

early cases clearly held that professional self-regulation measures taken
against HMOs and their physicians because of the HMO organizational form are the kinds of restraints considered illegal under antitrust
law. 31 The courts suggested also that any more specific professional
self-regulation
measures against HMOs would be examined most care32
fully.

The early cases did not, however, determine whether restraints

against HMOs have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce, a
cal society may include denial of admitting privileges at local hospitals, failure to obtain specialty
ratings or continuing education, and higher malpractice rates. Group Health Coop. v. King
County Medical Soe'y., 39 Wash. 2d at 626, 631-32, 237 P.2d at 759, 761-62; Kessel, supra note 6,
at 30-32; Rayack, supra note 6, at 666-67.
27. See American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 529-33 (1943); Group Health
Coop. v. King County Medical Soe'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 616-25, 237 P.2d 737,754-58 (1951). This
practice of course would be most damaging to HMOs that do not control their own hospital facilities, but it also might limit the operational flexibility and comprehensive nature of services offered
by smaller hospital-based HMOs. See id. at 624-25, 237 P.2d at 758.
28. See American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 529-33 (1943); Group Health
Coop. v. King County Medical Soe'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 627-29, 237 P.2d 737, 759-60 (1951).
29. See Group Health Coop. v. King County Medical Soe'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 630, 237 P.2d
737, 761 (1951); Rayack, supra note 6, at 680.
30. See Goldberg & Greenberg, supra note 19, at 59-62; Havighurst, HMOs 777-81.
31. See American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). The Court held in
this case that a restraint of trade could be proved by evidence that fee-for-service physicians and
their medical societies had conspired to exclude HMO physicians from local societies and hospitals and to refrain from referrals and consultations with HMO physicians. On its face, this case
seems to reject the professional self-regulation defense for anticompetitive behavior that is designed to affect HMOs. See Havighurst, HMOs 777-78. In view of the Supreme Court's cryptic
footnote 17 in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17, however, which provided
that some professional restraints may receive special treatment under the Sherman Act, the possibility of a professional self-regulation defense may remain in some HMO cases. See text accompanying notes 75-76 infra.
32. See Group Health Coop. v. King County Medical Soe'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737
(1951). The Washington Supreme Court held in this case that a plaintiff HMO had proved the
existence of three restrictive practices: concerted exclusion of HMO physicians from the county
society, concerted exclusion of these physicians from hospitals and concerted refusals of fee-forservice physicians to consult with these physicians. Id. at 616-32, 237 P.2d at 754-62. The court
noted the absence of any evidence to support the defendants' claim of substandard service by
HMO physicians, and the failure of the medical society to base its claim on an examination of the
HMO's operations. Id at 605-14, 237 P.2d at 748-54.
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finding which is necessary before the Sherman Act can apply.3 3 Nor

do they provide useful precedent for attacking anticompetitive behav-

ior against HMOs by fee-for-service controlled health insurers; 34 in fact
the trial court decision in one of the cases suggests that substantial leeway might be provided in this regard.
By the early 1970s observers of the HMO scene could report that

medical societies were taking a more liberal attitude toward the HMO,
perhaps in significant part because of the above noted-decisions and
several subsequent out-of-court settlements. 36 Nonetheless, these reports tended to come from relatively well-established HMOs, and concern still was expressed about "more subtle techniques" of organized

medicine that might obstruct HMO development and about professional resistance to HMO expansion into new communities.3 7 These
contemporary concerns will be examined after the early public law restraints against HMOs are first surveyed.
2.

PublicRestraints:Restrictive Use ofState Laws. Fee-for-serv-

ice physicians also moved against HMOs by obtaining or attempting to
enforce a variety of state laws that were designed for other purposes but
could be used to prohibit or retard HMO operations. One quite basic
approach was to use state licensing boards to revoke or deny licenses to
HMO physicians.

The practice of "unethical medicine" and more

technical claims relating to "unethical" or "illegal" physician advertising and physician delegation of medical acts were reasons given to support these actions. 38 The effectiveness of this approach was reduced,

however, by some healthy political opposition and judicial review of
33. The Supreme Court, in American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943),
found no reason to discuss this question, because the case involved an HMO in the District of
Columbia, for which the Court had jurisdiction under section 3 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3

(1976). Only state antitrust law was involved in the other major HMO case, Group Health Coop.
v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951). In a third antitrust case,

which involved physician restraints against commercial health insurance companies, neither the
trial court nor the Supreme Court dealt conclusively with the interstate commerce issue as it applies to health services and insurance. See United States v. Oregon State Medical Soe'y, 343 U.S.
326, 331, 338-39 (1952).
34. Cf United States v. Oregon State Medical Soe'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952) (the United States
unsuccessfully urged that fee-for-service physicians, their medical societies and their Blue Cross
plans had violated the Sherman Act by conspiring to restrain and monopolize the sale of medical
insurance in the state).
.35. See United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 95 F. Supp. 103, 116-19 (D. Or. 1950),
a~fda 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
36. See Note, supra note 2, at 958-59.
37. Id 959-60.
38. See Kessel, supra note 6, at 34-36. See also Garfield v. Board of Medical Examiners, 99
Cal. App. 2d 219, 221 P.2d 705 (1950).
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the administrative process. 39 It remains true, though, that the administrative licensing process might be used unfairly against HMOs by feefor-service physicians in varying ways. State medical licensing boards
continue to be dominated by organized medicine,4 0 and these boards

may be able to restrain HMO operations or sanction their physicians
unfairly under state legal restrictions against physician advertising or
innovative delegation of medical acts.4 '
The success of organized medicine in obtaining Blue Shield enabling laws established another restraint on HMO operation. These
statutes had the effect of limiting or prohibiting operation of any medical service plan, including that of an HMO, that was not controlled by
fee-for-service physicians.4z Typically these statutes require any nonprofit medical service plan to obtain county medical society approval,
to include a certain percentage of local physicians as members or to be
open to all physicians who desire to join.4 3

Some early HMOs were

able to avoid the apparently prohibitory effect of these provisions by
judicial interpretation of the legislative intent behind Blue Shield
laws, 44 by obtaining flexible interpretations of the laws by administrative officials,4' or through successful constitutional attack based on due
process and unlawful delegation of authority theories.4 6 The Health
Maintenance Organization Act of 197341 preempts state Blue Shield
39. See W. MACCOLL, supra note 2, at 21; Kessel, supra note 6, at 35-36.
40. These boards are composed almost entirely of physicians appointed on the recommendation or nomination of state medical societies. Forgotson, Roemer & Newman, Legal Regulation
of Health Personnelin the United States,in 2 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON
HEALTH MANPOWER 279, 296-97 (1967). There have been recent moves to include "public members" on medical licensing boards, but physicians still retain overwhelming voting power where
this has occurred. See HEALTH RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, STATE REGULATION OF HEALTH MANPOWER 157-60 (1977).
41. On state legal standards that seem to unduly restrict advertising by HMOs, see Kissam &
Johnson, State HlMO Laws44. On the complex nature of state legal restrictions against the innovative delegation of medical acts by physicians, see Kissam, Physician rAssistant andNursePractitioner Laws: .4 Study ofHealth Law Reform, 24 KAN. L. REV. 1 (1975). Cf. Feminist Women's
Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Fla. 1976), rev'don other grounds on
rehearing,No. TCA 75-186 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 18 & Dec. 3, 1976) (now on appeal to the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals) (informal sanctions from a state medical board against physicians working in a
low-cost abortion clinic).
42. See, eg., Hansen, Laws 4ffecting Group Health Plans, 35 IOWA L. REv. 209, 223-28
(1950); Note, supra note 2, at 962-69.
43. Note, supra note 2, at 963.
44. See Complete Service Bureau v. San Diego County Medical Soc'y, 43 Cal. 2d 201, 272
P.2d 497 (1954).
45. See Note, supra note 2, at 964-67.
46. See Group Health Ins. v. Howell, 43 N.J. 104, 202 A.2d 689 (1964); Group Health Ins. v.
Howell, 40 NJ. 436, 193 A.2d 103 (1963).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 300e (Supp. V 1975). The preemption provision mentioned in the text is
section 300e-10(a)(1)(A)-(C). In this decade three pieces of federal legislation have been enacted
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Moreover, HMO enabling statutes re-

cently enacted by more than half of the states48 have helped to protect

to promote HMO development by improving their access to public and private health insurance
markets, preempting certain forms of restrictive state laws, and providing developmental subsidies. In 1972 the Medicare and Medicaid laws were amended to authorize prepaid contracts
between these programs and HMOs serving their beneficiaries. Social Security Amendments of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, §§ 213(a), 226(a), 86 Stat. 1329, 1384, 1396 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
1395mm, 1396(c)(23) (Supp. V 1975)). The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 followed, and then in 1976 the previous laws were amended in several significant respects. Health
Maintenance Organization Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-460, 90 Stat. 1945 (codified at
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1977)).
The general problem with this legislation, from an antitrust point of view, is that it fails to
promote HMOs as a fully competitive force in health service markets. See INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, supranote 1. To be sure, the 1976 amendments in general reduced the costs to HMOs
of participating in federal programs, but because of competing policy goals and continuing political opposition to HMOs these amendments did not remove all anticompetitive burdens on federally qualified HMOs. See Kissam & Johnson, FederalHfO Laws 1199-1222; BUSINESS WEEK,
May 30, 1977, at 74-76. Remaining statutory obstacles include requirements under the Health
Maintenance Organization Act that qualified HMOs offer relatively comprehensive insurance
benefits to their subscribers, 42 U.S.C. § 300e-l(l) (Supp. V 1975), use community rather than
experience rating to establish premium levels, id. § 300e(b)(1)(c), and assume most of the financial
risk involved under their policies, id. § 300e(c)(2). The assumption of financial risk requirements
allow qualified HMOs to reinsure only against risks of catastrophic illnesses, extraordinary aggregate losses, and services provided to HMO enrollees by other persons or institutions. Id This
provision effectively eliminates the possibility of qualified HMOs reinsuring against major risks
like hospital costs.
It also remains true that only relatively large HMOs may qualify for risk-sharing prepaid
contracts with the Medicare program. Id. § 1395mm(i)(2)(A). See Kissam & Johnson, Federal
HAO Laws 1227-28 nA30. Moreover, various Medicare and state Medicaid requirements on
prepaid contracts with HMOs have been designed to obtain immediate government cost savings
but appear to unduly increase the profitability of such contracts for HMOs. See Kissam & Johnson, State HMO Laws 59-62. Finally, the 1976 amendments introduced a new requirement that
Medicare and Medicaid HMOs must comply with various standards under the Health Maintenance Organization Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395mm(b)(l)(B), 1396(m)(1)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1977), a
requirement just implemented for Medicare and Medicaid HMOs by regulations published in 43
Fed. Reg. 5822 (1978) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.2001, 405.2050(b), 499.82). The amendments also included the potentially costly requirements that one-third of the HMO's governing
body be members with no ownership or financial interests, 43 Fed. Reg. 5824 (1978), and that the
HMO furnish health education and medical social services to all members whether or not these
services are funded by Medicare or Medicaid. Id. 5825.
48. As of July, 1976, HEW listed 27 states with HMO enabling laws and noted that such
legislation was pending in about 10 other states. HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS: 2D ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 6 (1976). These laws are designed to free HMOs from the earlier

public law restraints and to provide financial and quality-of-care regulation that is tailored to
meet the unique characteristics of HMOs. See Kissam & Johnson, State HMO Laws 35-36.
These laws in general avoid many of the unnecessarily costly requirements imposed by the federal
Health Maintenance Organization Act. See note 47, supra. For example, state HMO statutes
require neither very sweeping comprehensive benefits nor community rating for premiums. See
Kissam & Johnson, State HMO Laws 47-48, 50-51. Most of these acts allow HMOs to contract
for substantial reinsurance of risks. See id. 52.
On the other hand, state HMO enabling statutes do introduce some new potentially anticompetitive obstacles, and they tend to follow the federal act in its failure to free HMOs from overly
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HMOs. Nonetheless, non-federally qualified HMOs located in states
with Blue Shield laws but no HMO statutes still may face extra devel-

opment costs for protracted litigation or political lobbying in order to
organize under the avoidance techniques just noted.4 9

A third attempt to eliminate HMOs consisted of legal actions
based on the claim that HMOs were violating the time-honored common law rule against the corporate practice of medicine."0 This charge

was met successfully in several cases by arguments that the HMO in
question was a non profit one and so organized as to allow its physicians to practice medicine without lay interference.-' This problem,
too, has been diminished by the new federal and state HMO laws,

which explicitly or implicitly preclude application of the corporate
practice rule to many HMOs.52 Yet non-federally qualified HMOs in
states without HMO enabling statutes may remain vulnerable, especially if they are profit-seeking organizations.53
Early HMOs also were often subjected to inappropriate financial
regulation under general insurance codes or Blue Shield statutes.5 4 Al-

restrictive state restrictions on advertising and expanded medical delegation. In particular, most
statutes authorize insurance departments to regulate HMO premiums, which generally seems inappropriate in view of HMOs' incentives to contain costs and compete for business against established insurers. See id 52-54. A few laws also apply only to nonprofit HMOs, see MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 62D.02(4) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1554(a) (Purdon Supp. 1977);
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 58-41-2 (Supp. 1977), and under at least one state regulation HMOs
are subject to quality assurance review by the regional PSRO, seelowa Ins. Dep't Rule 12.5(1 l)(b)
(1974). Several states follow the Health Maintenance Organization Act in expressly prohibiting
HMO advertising from addressing quality of care matters, and no state's HMO law expressly
authorizes such advertising. See Kissam & Johnson, State HMO Laws 44. Nor do these statutes
attempt to free qualified HMOs from restrictions in other state laws on expanded medical delegation. Id 55.
49. See Note, supra note 2, at 967-68.
50. See id 960-62. For discussion of this rule and the inappropriateness of applying it to
HMOs, see Hansen, supra note 42, at 211-19; Kissam & Johnson, State HlMO Laws 30 n.66.
51. See Group Health Ass'n v. Moor, 24 F. Supp. 445, 446 (D.D.C. 1938), afd on other
groundssub non. Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Complete Service
Bureau v. San Diego County Medical Soe'y, 43 CaL. 2d 222, 228, 272 P.2d 497, 502 (1954); Group
Health Coop. v. King County Medical Soe'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 661-62, 237 P.2d 737, 777-78
(1951).
52. See Kissam & Johnson, State lIMO Laws 29-30, 39.
53. In at least one state some not-for-profit HMOs as well as profit-making ones are vulnerable. In 1971 Texas codified its corporate practice rule to allow only physician-controlled nonprofit corporations to engage in the delivery of medical care. Tax. CODE ANN. tit. 71, § 4509a
(Vernon 1972). This provision was upheld as a reasonable regulation of medical care against
constitutional claims of a consumer-controlled nonprofit organization that attempted to organize
and incorporate an HMO under Texas law and was rejected by the state. Garcia v. Texas State
Bd. of Medical Examiners, 384 F. Supp. 434 (W.D. Tex. 1974), a 'd mem., 421 U.S. 995 (1975).
54. See Note, supra note 2, at 969-74. In at least one case, however, an HMO was able to
avoid such regulation by a judicial decision that its operations did not fall within the scope of the
insurance law. Group Health Ass'n v. Moor, 24 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1938), a 'd sub noni.
Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
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though HMOs are insurers, their distinctive characteristic of providing
services rather than cash upon occurrence of the insurable event means
that initial capitalization and reserve requirements appropriate for
other insurers may be overly restrictive for HMOs." This problem,
too, has been mitigated by the Health Maintenance Organization Act,
which preempts application of general state insurance capitalization
and reserve requirements to federally qualified HMOs, 56 and by state
57
statutes that provide for unique financial controls over HMOs.
Even under state HMO laws, however, inappropriate financial regulation may persist. State insurance departments remain generally responsible for financial regulation of HMOs, and these departments may be
captives of the fee-for-service health insurers or of their past regulatory
experience with cash payment insurance."8 There also is some evidence
that new HMO formation has been deterred by apparently high
financial requirements established by or under state HMO statutes.5 9
In summary, the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973
and the new state HMO enabling statutes have changed substantially
the legal environment within which many HMOs operate. This legislation has not removed all public law anticompetitive restraints on
HMOs, however, and, as will be shown, such restraints may play an
role in future antitrust litigation designed to protect
important
0
6

HMOs.

III.

PRIVATE ANTICOMPETITIVE OBSTACLES

The relevant cases, statutes and literature suggest a considerable
variety of means, many of them new, that the fee-for-service sector may
employ unfairly to block HMO development. This section will consider the application of federal antitrust law to anticompetitive behavior by private entities, although some of these "private" restraints can
take on a "public" character.
The Interstate Commerce Question.
The early antitrust cases involving anti-HMO restraints did not
resolve the issue of whether restraints on HMOs ever may be defended
on the ground that they are outside the scope of interstate commerce to
A.

55. See INsTrrTUTE OF MEDICINE, supranote 1, at 23-24; Note, supra note 2, at 972-73. But
Gf INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 1, at 68 (a dissenting opinion claiming that the efficiency

of any regulatory alternative to reserve requirements is not clear and deserves further study).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-10(a)(1)(D) (Supp. V 1975).
57. See Kissam & Johnson, State HMO Laws 41-42.
58. Id. 38.
59. See McNeil & Schlenker, supra note 12, at 207-08.
60. See text accompanying notes 114-18, 150-69 & 296-315 infra.
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which sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act apply. 61 Two arguments
are available to establish the "substantial effect" on interstate commerce of any anti-HMO restraint.62 The first, which focuses on the
HMO's purchase of supplies and other inputs from interstate commerce, draws strong support from the Supreme Court's recent decision
in HospitalBuilding Co. v. Rex Hospital6' This approach alone, however, might require a difficult determination with respect to smaller
HMOs. The second argument focuses on the HMO as insurer and its
impact on the interstate transactions of other health insurers. This approach is more speculative, but it is logically more satisfying and seems
to avoid the difficulty arising from a determination in the case of
smaller HMOs.
In Rex Hospital the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of
whether locally-instituted restraints against a hospital's expansion from
a 49 bed facility to one of 140 beds could be covered by the Sherman
Act. Plaintiff's complaint had been dismissed because of an insufficient nexus between the alleged antitrust violations and interstate commerce. Plaintiff hospital had alleged a cluster of contacts between its
operations and interstate commerce, such as purchase of up to fifty percent of the hospital's drugs and other supplies from out-of-state sellers,
significant revenues from out-of-state insurance companies and from
the federal government through Medicare and Medicaid, a substantial
number of out-of-state patients, a management service fee paid to the
hospital's out-of-state parent, and out-of-state financing for the hospital's planned expansion.' The Court held that this "combination of
factors," if proved in subsequent proceedings, was "certainly sufficient
to establish a 'substantial effect' on interstate commerce. 65
The Court also held that the "indirect" nature of the alleged effect
on interstate commerce and the absence of any activity "purposely directed toward interstate commerce" were immaterial to the resolution
61. Both sections apply only to "trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign

nations." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1,2(1976). The Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts, id §§ 12-27, apply
only to "commodity" transactions or to persons "engaged in [interstate] commerce" and therefore
are not directly relevant to antitrust protection of HMOs.
62. For recent discussions of the "flow of commerce" and "substantial effect" tests for resolving interstate commerce questions under the Sherman Act, see L. SULLIVAN § 233a; Furgeson, The
Commerce Test/or JurisdictionUnder the Sherman Act, 12 HoUsToN L. REv. 1052 (1975); Comment, The Confusing World of Interstate Commerce and Jurisdiction Under the Sherman Act-A
Look at the Development andFuture of CurrentlyEmployed JurisdictionalTests, 21 VILL. L. REv.
721 (1976). HMOs do not seem to operate within the flow of commerce in most instances because
their insurance and provider services are usually sold to policyholders residing within one state.

63. 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
64. Id at 741.
65. 'Id at 744.
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of the interstate commerce question.6 6 In so doing the Court in effect
overruled the approach of lower courts in several circuits that had reon interquired "direct" or "purposeful" effects of alleged restraints
67
jurisdiction.
Act
Sherman
find
to
order
in
commerce
state

Rex Hospitalclears the way for applying the Sherman Act to antiHMO restraints on the ground that the restraints will affect adversely
an HMO's purchase of supplies in interstate commerce and the HMO's

provision of service to Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries. But the
Court's reliance on the entire cluster of alleged interstate contacts

leaves open the ultimate question of where the line between substantial
and de minimus contacts will or should be drawn. Many HMOs may

purchase a significant percentage of their supplies from interstate commerce (in particular, drugs) or otherwise affect such commerce (for ex-

ample, by drug prescriptions),68 but for smaller HMOs the dollar
amount of commerce so affected may not be large. Moreover, by no

means do all HMOs serve Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries, 69 and

relatively few HMOs may have the other interstate contacts possessed
by the plaintiff in Rex Hospital
Differences in the quantum of such interstate contacts between any
HMO and the plaintiff in Rex Hospitalmay be easily surmountable.
There would seem to be no principled distinction between the mere

purchase of supplies in interstate commerce by a small HMO and the
cluster of interstate contacts considered sufficient in Rex Hospital.Furthermore, circuit courts that have applied the "purchase of inputs" ap-

proach in cases involving health care institutions have not drawn any
clear line between substantial and de minimus effects on interstate
commerce.70
At times, however, antitrust courts have been concerned about es-

tablishing some express limits that exclude de minimus effects. 71 More66. Id at 744-45.
67. See Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., 332 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1964); Elizabeth
Hosp., Inc. v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 381 U.S. 884 (1959); Spears Free
Clinic & Hosp. v. Cleere, 197 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1952). See also Furgeson, supra note 62, at
1060-65.
68. See Havighurst, HMOs 778-80.
69. See Havighurst & Bovbjerg, supra note 8, at 383 n.9. See also Kissam & Johnson, Federal HMO Laws 1224-30.
70. See Ballard v. Blue Shield, 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976) (decided after Rex Hospital); St.
Bernard Gen. Hosp. v. Hospital Serv. Ass'n, 510 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1975); Doctor's, Inc. v. Blue
Cross, 490 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1973). See also Furgeson, supra note 62, at 1065-67.
71. See, eg., Doctor's, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 490 F.2d 48, 53-54 (3d Cir. 1973). Judicial tmwillingness to give the Sherman Act as broad a scope as the commerce clause seems appropriate in
view of congressional silence on the intended reach of the Sherman Act and the constraining
constitutional principle of federalism. Although the Supreme Court has stated that "Congress
wanted to go to the utmost extent of its Constitutional power" in applying the Sherman Act to
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over, in applying the Rex Hospitalapproach to health care institutions
some circuits have focused on more than the purchase of supplies by
one institution to find Sherman Act jurisdiction. In Doctors, Inc. v.
Blue Cross,7 2 for example, the Third Circuit was satisfied by plaintiff's
allegations of a possibly adverse effect upon out-of-state supplies
purchased by both plaintiff and other hospitals in the area whose operations might be curtailed by the alleged restraints. The court apparently emphasized the dollar amount of plaintiff's purchases in
interstate commerce ($233,000 in 1972) and the fact that defendants
possessed enough market power to shut down the plaintiff and other
hospitals by means of the alleged restraints.73
Should Rex Hospital's"purchase of inputs" approach to Sherman
Act jurisdiction prove insufficient by itself to cover smaller HMOs
faced with restraints by less powerful defendants, one may also argue
that the competitive presence of the HMO is likely to have a significant
effect on the interstate transactions of other insurers. 74 The de minimus objection to Sherman Act jurisdiction can be answered by the
qualitative argument that the efficient HMO entrant, no matter how
small, could have a significant impact on the price of health insurance
sold in interstate commerce.
anticompetitive behavior, United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558
(1944), it should be noted that this oft quoted statement was made in connection with the Court's
decision that insurance services constituted "commerce" under the Sherman Act and not in con-

nection with how far the Act should extend to localized activities that in 1890 certainly were not
considered to be within the commerce power. On the value of considering constraining constitu-

tional principles such as the federalism principle in "hard cases" of statutory interpretation, see
Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1057, 1085-87 (1975).
72. 490 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1973).

73. Another circuit court which used a similar analysis was the Fifth Circuit, which in St.
Bernard Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Hospital Serv. Ass'n, 510 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1975), followed Doctors

Inc. in all significant respects. Finally, in Ballard v. Blue Shield, 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976),
the Fourth Circuit applied Rex Hospitalto hold that chiropractors might establish Sherman Act
jurisdiction in contesting their exclusion from Blue Shield on the basis of possibly adverse effects
upon out-of-state purchases, out-of-state patients and interstate health insurance companies that

do pay chiropractors' claims. This holding also seemed to rely on the defendant's apparent power
to injure chiropractors throughout the state. See also City of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n, 562
F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1977).

74. These transactions include those of commercial health insurers doing business in states as
foreign companies as well as those of modern Blue Shield and Blue Cross plans. Blue plans are

locally based, but these plans are members of national organizations that perform significant commercial services for the local plans such as soliciting and maintaining national accounts from
multi-state companies and unions. See S. LAW, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONo? 20-21 (2d ed.

1976).
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Fee-for-service physicians generally control the access of HMOs
and their physicians to a number of essential or desirable resources.
These resources include membership in county medical societies, hospital staff privileges and favorable hospital by-laws, medical school appointments and access to the referral and consulting network which
exists among fee-for-service physicians.
The prominent social position of physicians, particularly in
smaller communities, also may give them the power of social disapproval that can discourage HMO participation by both physicians and
consumers. 76 Fee-for-service physicians also are in a strong position to
seek state legislative or administrative action that can restrain effective
HMO competition. Each of these control mechanisms may be exercised in ways that raise difficult questions of antitrust law.
1. Boycotts and Refusals to Deal. Apart from collective attempts by physicians to obtain state action that disfavors HMOs, any
agreement by physicians to exclude other physicians from desirable resources because of their HMO association is clearly a per se violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The case of American MedicalAssociation v. United States7 7 and the line of more recent Supreme Court
cases that apply a per se rule to group boycotts against competitors qua
competitors7l are ample authority for this proposition. This result
should not be changed by the reference in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar79 to the possibility that some professional restraints may justify
special antitrust treatment. 80 Explicit or "classic" boycotts of this sort
produce substantial competitive harm, and other less restrictive meth75. Another important resource to HMO physicians is certification by the national specialty
boards established and controlled by organized medicine. See generall R. STEVENS, AMERICAN
MEDICINE AND THE PUBLIC-INTEREST 75-414 (1971). Decision making by these boards histori-

cally exhibited the same subjective quality and concern with an applicant physician's "ethical
fitness" that has been a problem for HMO physicians trying to obtain admission to a county
medical society or hospital. Id. 248-50, 319-24. Today, however, most specialty boards are em-

ploying objective tests for certification, id 343-44, and they tend to be dominated by national
leaders of organized medicine and elite specialists, see, e.g., id. 327-30, who probably have little to

fear from HMO practices. One thus may expect modern professional opposition to HMOs to
occur mostly at a local level. See Havighurst, HMOs 767; Rayack, supra note 6, at 665.
76. See Rayack, su.pra note 6, at 666; Comment, The American Medical Associatiorn Power,
Purpose and Politicsin OrganizedMedicine, 63 YALE L.J. 937, 1019-21 (1954).
77. 317 U.S. 519 (1943).

78. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Silver v. New York
Stock Exch., 373'U.S. 341 (1963); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 208 (1959).
See also L. SULLIVAN § 84.

79. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
80. Id.at 788 n.17.
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ods of regulating HMOs' quality of care are available. 8'
A different situation exists with other forms of collective action by
physicians that have the same anticompetitive purposes and effects as
the classic boycott but can be justified by more persuasive reasons than
the sweeping claim of "professional self-regulation." In these situations, Professor Sullivan notes, courts should and in effect do ask two
questions. First, should the conduct be characterized, upon preliminary examination, as a group boycott that is per se illegal because it has
the same purposes or effects as those of an explicit boycott?82 Second,
if not, does the challenged conduct withstand a rule of reason analysis
that attempts to balance competitive harms against competing legitimate values?8 3 Although courts in health care cases may be distracted
from this two-step approach by Goldfarb's reference to special treatment of professional restraints, it will be argued below that this twostep approach remains appropriate and in effect has been followed in at
least one post- Goldfarb decision involving health care. 4 First, however, this two-step approach will be illustrated by a hypothetical situation. This suggests the value of Professor Sullivan's two-step approach
for analyzing conduct that tends to have a boycott effect upon HMOs.
It also suggests that courts may face substantial difficulty in addressing
quality-of-care claims that are used by fee-for-service physicians to justify exclusion of HMOs from desirable resources.
Suppose that a non-hospital based HMO develops a new obstetrics
program for normal, low-risk pregnancies. These cases are to be managed by nurse practitioners with supervision from HMO physicians on
an on-call basis, and will result in patient stays of 24 hours or less in the
local hospital. The HMO plans to provide these services to its own subscribers and to fee-for-service patients as well. Fee-for-service obstetricians at the hospital do not employ nurse practitioners and follow
procedures that result in a four day average length of stay for normal
deliveries. These physicians obtain a hospital by-law that bans giving
primary responsibility to nurse practitioners and requires other procedures that will lengthen the average stay of HMO maternity patients to
three days. The fee-for-service physicians justify this by-law on the
ground that it reduces risk in normal deliveries by some amount,
81. See L. SULLIVAN § 85; Comment, The MedicalProfessionand the Sherman Act: Wolf v.
Jane Phillips Episcopal-Memorial Medical Center, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 196, 208-09. Less restrictive alternatives to regulate HMOs' quality of care are described in text accompanying note 24
supra.
82. L. SULLIVAN § 86.

83. Id. § 88.
84. Veizaga v. National Bd. for Respiratory Therapy, [1977-1] TRADE CASES (CCH)

(N.D. IM.Jan. 27, 1977).

61,274
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Suppose

further that each side can rely on studies, all inconclusive, that suggest
some increase or no increase in risk from the HMO's program. Should
this kind of restraint on HMOs be considered a per se illegal boycott or,
alternatively, illegal under the rule of reason?
Arguably this restraint should be characterized as a group boycott
and subjected to the per se rule. The purposes of the fee-for-service

physicians may be shown by their economic incentive to prevent the
HMO practice8 5 and their use of "non objective" standards to support
the by-law. 6 Furthermore, one can point to several less restrictive alternatives that would ensure adequate quality of care in this situation.

For example, the physician-nurse practitioner relationship is subject to
explicit regulation by many states, often in quite detailed terms, 7 and
in any event physician and nurse practices are regulated generally by
state licensing boards. Similarly, the hospital and HMO are subject to
quality-of-care regulation by a variety of governmental and external
private bodies.8 8 Finally, this kind of quality-of-care issue may better
be left to a case-by-case determination under medical malpractice
law.8 9 Malpractice cases provide the chance to focus expert evidence
upon particular harms that have occurred rather than speculative

harms that are likely to be alleged in antitrust cases to justify professional self-regulation.90
The hospital and fee-for-service physicians will defend their action

as necessary to provide more-than-minimum quality to the hospital's
patients. This is an apparently legitimate competing value, and one

which may draw particular support from recent malpractice decisions
making hospitals and even entire medical staffs jointly liable for incompetent practices within the hospital. 9 ' If antitrust courts are un85. See Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258, 1269 (N.D.
Fla. 1976), rev'd on other grounds on rehearing, No. TCA 75-186 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 18 & Dec. 3,
1976) (now on appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals).
86. See 415 F. Supp. at 1270. See also Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke
Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 259 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
87. See Kissam, Physician'sAssistant and Nurse PractitionerLaws: A Study of Health Law
Reform, 24 U. KAN. L. REv. 1 (1975).
88. See Kissam & Johnson, State HMO Laws 45-47; Worthington & Silver, Regulation of
Quality of Care in Hospitals: The Needfor Change, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 305 (1970).
89. For a good discussion of medical malpractice law and HMOs, see Bovbjerg, The Medical
Malpractice Standardof Care: HMOs and Customary Practice, 1975 DutKE L.J. 1375. On the
quality of care restraints imposed on early HMOs by malpractice law, see Curran & Mosely, The
Malpractice Experience of Health Maintenance Organizations,70 Nw. U.L. RV. 69 (1975).
90. See, eg., Group Health Coop. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 607-15,
237 P.2d 737, 749-53 (1951). If previous harms have occurred, the question may be asked why
fee-for-service physicians have not referred these cases to other authorities.
91. See Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 IM.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253
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willing to question the relative subjectivity of the standards used to
uphold this kind of by-law,92 they may well choose to apply a rule of
reason analysis. This would involve balancing quite disparate effects
(competitive harm versus medical quality) and would place the burden
on the plaintiff to show that the competitive harms outweigh the benefits. Applying the rule of reason would also encourage courts to defer
to the opinion of the professional majority about the need for higher
quality care. 3 In this thicket HMOs may have difficulty establishing
their case.
The suggested approach for analyzing physician boycotts and
other boycott-like behavior against HMOs may be related to the general issue of how post- Goldfarb antitrust courts should treat the professional self-regulation defense when conduct complained of otherwise
would be a per se violation. Varying approaches to this issue have
been suggested by lower courts and commentators. One tactic would
be to treat all such cases under the rule of reason.94 This approach,
however, seems overly favorable to professional interests. A mere
claim of professional self-regulation would impose upon a plaintiff the
burden of proving specific bad intent or effects, notwithstanding the
fact that offenses of a per se nature previously have been judged to be
so pernicious and of such destructive effect that they may be banned
without this proof.9"
One court, in Veizaga v. NationalBoardforRespiratoryTherapy ,96
and one commentator, Douglas Rigler, 97 have proposed closely related
"two-step" analyses that attempt to provide a more balanced considera(1965); Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 350 A.2d 534 (1975); Fiorentino v.
Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296 (1967).
92. For an earlier antitrust case indicating judicial unwillingness to question subjective standards governing "social" as opposed to "commercial" behavior, see Hughes Tool Co. v. Motion

Picture Ass'n, 66 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). But see Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc.
v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258, 1270 (N.D. Fla. 1976), rev'don other grounds on rehearing, No.
TCA 75-186 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 18 & Dec. 3, 1976) (now on appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals).
93. Compare the judicial deference shown to professional judgment in cases that have questioned on due process grounds the unreasonableness of hospital standards governing physician
admitting privileges. See, e.g., Sosa v. Board of Managers, 437 F.2d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1971).
94. See Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 825 (1977); Bauer, ProfessionalActivities and the Antitrust Laws, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 570,
584-92 (1975); Tyler, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar. The Professions are Subject to the Sherman
Act, 41 Mo. L. REv. 1, 10-12 (1976).
95. See Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258, 1263 (N.D.
Fla. 1976), rev'd on other grounds on rehearing, No. TCA 75-186 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 18 & Dec. 3,
1976) (now on appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals).
96. [1977-1] TRADE CASES (CCH)

61,274 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 1977).

97. Rigler, Professional Codes of Conduct After Goldfarb: A Proposed Method of Antitrust
Analsis, 29 ARK. L. Rav. 185 (1976).
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tion of the conflicting interests served by competition and professional
regulation. The first step is to determine whether the challenged activity is "commercial" or "noncommercial" in its nature and character. 98
The second step under Veizaga is to apply relevant per se rules to commercial activities but only a rule of reason analysis to noncommercial
ones, even if the alleged restraint is of a per se nature. 99 Rigler also
would apply per se rules to commercial activities, although he would
exempt wholly "noncommercial" professional activities from Sherman
Act jurisdiction."° The obvious problem presented by these approaches is the potentially mechanical and perhaps unmanageable distinction that they would draw between "commercial" and
"noncommercial" activities. It is not clear for example, into what category hospital decisions to grant staff privileges or enact medical procedure by-laws would fall.
A third, preferable way to relate per se rules and professional selfregulation interests was employed in a Florida district court's first deci0 ' In this
sion in Feminist Women's Health Center,Inc. v. Mohammad.1
case an outpatient abortion center sought relief from an alleged boycott
by fee-for-service obstetricians that had deprived the center of physicians and back-up services at the local hospital. In ruling on plaintiff's
motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court held that the
plaintiff could rely on its complaint of a per se violation unless the
defendants established that their professional self-regulation measures
had been carried out in "good faith."' 2 The court stated the good
faith test to be "whether the defendants were motivated by a bona fide
concern over medical or ethical standards rather than by an anticompetitive animus' 10 3 and held that defendants were not likely to satisfy this
test. The court relied chiefly on the substantial difference in fees
charged for abortions by the center and by defendant obstetricians, the
uncertainty of medical standards concerning appropriate abortion services, and the failure of defendants to undertake any "thoroughgoing
inquiry" concerning the quality of care rendered at the center. 104 This
98. Id. 189-91.

99. [1977-1] TRADE CASES (CCII) 1 61,274, at 70,870.
100. Rigler, supra note 97, at 189-90.
101. 415 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Fla. 1976). This decision subsequently was modified by two
other orders that resulted in a dismissal prior to trial on other grounds. No. TCA 75-186 (N.D.

Fla. Nov. 18 & Dec. 3, 1976) (now on appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals).
102. 415 F. Supp. at 1269.
103. Id

104. Id at 1270. This court's demand for a "thoroughgoing inquiry" by defendants parallels
the Washington Supreme Court's approach to the professional self-regulation issue in Group
Health Coop. v. King County Soe'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 606-14, 237 P.2d 737, 748-54 (1951).
In two subsequent decisions the Florida district court modified its good faith test to take into
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approach has the merit of focusing on specific justifications for profes-

sional self-regulation and avoiding an overly general inquiry into
"commercial" versus "noncommercial" essences of professional activities. It also seems quite similar if not identical to the suggested twostep approach for analyzing anti-HMO boycott behavior by physicians.
In the case of classic boycotts and other similar conduct to which a per
se rule should ordinarily apply, it would seem unlikely that defendants
could satisfy the Feminist Women's preliminary good faith test.
2. Conscious Parallelism. Many of the restraints available for
use against HMOs, such as the denial of access to consultation-referral
networks' 0 5 and the exercise of social disapproval or ostracism against
HMOs and their physicians, can be undertaken on an independent basis by individual fee-for-service physicians. These practices will have a
particularly damaging effect only if all or most physicians in the community follow them. It may happen, however, that many physicians
do engage in these practices with the awareness that other physicians
are involved but that there is no direct evidence of an agreement
among the physicians to act in concert or even of a proposal for joint
action. Since section 1 of the Sherman Act requires the finding of
some "contract. . .combination or conspiracy,"10 any antitrust attack
on this behavior is likely to face great difficulty in establishing the existence of an agreement by inference from circumstantial evidence. 0 7 In
account a Noerr-Penningtonclaim by the defendants that their communications implementing the
alleged boycott had been made within and to "public agencies." Feminist Women's Health
Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, No. TCA 75-186 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 18 & Dec. 3, 1976) (now on appeal
to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals). The Noerr-Penning/ondoctrine is discussed in text accompanying notes 114-18 infra. The court held that the effect of such a claim is to switch the burden
of proof back to the plaintif, who must then show that the communications to public agencies
were a "sham" and not intended to seek public agency action. Feminist Women's Health Center,
Inc. v. Mohammad, No. TCA 75-186, at 3 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 1976). The court then found that
the plaintiff had not satisfied this burden and dismissed the action prior to trial. Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, No. TCA 75-186, at 5-8 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 1976).
While the potential for success of a defense based on Noerr-Penningtonin this situation certainly
is significant, it does not detract from the value of Feminist Womenr approach to balancing per se
complaints and professional self-regulation claims.
105. The denial of HMO access to consultation-referral networks among fee-for-service physicians may harm both smaller HMOs, which do not employ their own specialists, and the fee-forservice practice of part-time HMO physicians.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
107. This kind of behavior by individual physicians, who arguably possess monopoly power,
might be analogized to the exclusionary conduct by monopolists or incipient monopolists that is
prohibited by section 2 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). See Havighurst, HIMOs 776
n.181. This alternative approach does not seem viable, however, in view of the courts' traditional
focus in monopoly cases on very large market shares possessed by single producers, Id, the fact
that this behavior by an individual physician will have only a relatively small effect on the HMO,
and the difference between ordering a corporation and an individual to serve all comers.
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this situation courts require some evidence in addition to consciously
uniform behavior to allow the fact finder to infer the existence of an
agreement.'l 8 This additional evidence must be sufficient to support a
plausible inference that the conduct complained of would not have occurred but for an agreement among the defendants.
In the case of fee-for-service physicians acting adversely to an
HMO's interest, the following analysis might be employed to support a
rational inference of agreement. If a relatively large number of physicians are engaged in these activities, it may be argued that many of
them individually would not have risked the economic loss from refusing to deal, or the possible social loss from appearing to be a public
critic of others' work, without some understanding that all or most of
their professional colleagues were going to be similarly engaged. As
noted, economic gains to fee-for-service physicians will not accrue
without relatively uniform behavior, although this point seems stronger
for refusals to consult with and refer to HMOs and their physicians
than for social disparagement of HMO operations. Additionally, the
involvement of a relatively large number of fee-for-service physicians
may help negate the competing explanation that the uniform behavior
interdependent but non collusive decisions by
results from °rationally
9

oligopolists.

The above argument seems rather weak, however, in view of several special circumstances involved with medical practice. Individual
physicians are not only economically calculating "business firms" but
also moral actors, who quite understandably may believe uniformly but
independently that prepaid medical practice is "wrong" and "bad" for
the public." 0 These beliefs may make physicians willing to risk some
economic loss by independent action; moreover, in view of physicians'
generally high incomes,"' any economic loss may be quite bearable.
108. See Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541
(1954); C-O Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.

892 (1952).
109. A competing explanation of oligopolistic interdependence also may be overcome by a
showing that identical behavior by oligopolists required a relatively complex form of behavior,
with substantial risks to the individual firm if others do not go along. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); C-O Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489
(9th Cir.), cert. denieda 344 U.S. 902 (1952). The behavior in our case, however, appears to be

quite simple and would not involve overwhelming loss to any individual physician if others fail to
go along.
110. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
I 11. The AMA's 1973 estimates for average net incomes of physicians by specialty range from

a little over $40,000 for pediatricians and general practitioners to more than $59,000 for surgeons.
D.

HAPGOOD,

THE SCRENmG OF THE AVERAGE MAN 129 (1974).

Of course it is the former

categories of physicians who stand to lose most from HMO competition, and perhaps $40,000 is
not enough.
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Furthermore, widespread moral beliefs among fee-for-service physicians may allow individual physicians to act interdependently, but yet
independently, as rational "oligopolists," despite the presence of a
much larger number of competitors than is usual. These arguments
suggest that independent or interdependent explanations of consciously
uniform behavior against HMOs and their physicians are just as plausible as an "agreement" to act in concert. Finally, the breadth and intensity of fee-for-service physicians' moral beliefs about HMOs may be
enhanced by communications among physicians that are protected for
first amendment reasons."' 2 In general, therefore, it may be inappropriate to rely on communications among physicians about the "evils"
of HMOs and on how individual physicians are responding or ought to
respond as evidence from which one may infer a specific agreement to
act in a concerted fashion. 113 If these arguments are sound, "conscious
parallelism" may be a good defense to many antitrust attacks against
common but noninstitutional behavior by physicians directed against
HMOs.
3. ProtectedCommunications. Two kinds of organized communication by and among fee-for-service physicians might be used to
strengthen physicians' resolve to act against HMOs and to help create a
negative image of HMOs with the public. The issue raised by each
type of communication is whether first amendment values are strong
enough to protect the organized communication itself from antitrust
attack as an unreasonable restraint of trade.
Under the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine'" 4 individuals may combine
to seek governmentally-imposed restraints upon their competitors without violating the antitrust laws, as long as their combination does not
constitute a "mere sham."' "1 5 This doctrine clearly protects a wide
112. See text accompanying notes 114-22 infra.

113. In other situations communications among competitors about prices (accompanied by
exhortations that a certain common price level will be advantageous to all) or about relatively
complex forms of behavior may be used to support the inference of an agreement to act in concert.
See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); American Column &
Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
114. See UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference
v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).

115. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144
(1961). The sham exception does limit this doctrine's scope, at least to the extent that it does not
protect violations of other laws from antitrust attack, see, P. ARmEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
393(e), 394 (2d ed. 1974), such as the abuse ofjudicial process by making repetitive, unfounded
claims, see California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), or deliber-

ate submission of false information to public officials, see Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,404 U.S. 1047 (1971); Harman v.
Valley Nat'1 Bank, 339 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964).
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range of speech that may be intended to have an ultimate effect upon
legislatures or administrative agencies, but that also harms competitors.
The Noerr-Penningtondoctrine seems to offer relatively broad protection from antitrust law for both private and public dissemination by
physician groups of anti-HMO propaganda that has "incidental" sideeffects of encouraging common physician behavior against HMOs or
disparaging HMOs with the public.11 6 The widespread nature of government regulation over HMOs' 17 and medical practice in general
should offer ample opportunities for legitimate attempts to influence
legislatures or administrative agencies responsible for enforcing existing laws. Moreover, the vulnerability of HMOs to the potential
charge of over-economizing 1 8 may make them relatively easy targets
for criticism that avoids violating other laws and therefore the sham
exception to Noerr-Pennington.
Apart from organized efforts to seek governmental restraints, the
exchange of information and opinions about HMOs among fee-forservice physicians presents a more difficult and perhaps novel question
of balancing first amendment and antitrust concerns. Suppose, for example, that in a series of meetings one or more physicians inform
others of the reasons why they are refusing to cooperate with HMOs.
Suppose also that these meetings are followed by relatively uniform
noncooperation with HMOs and their physicians.
On the one hand, this exchange and the subsequent behavior
might be viewed as similar to the situation where a trade association
meeting at which a firm or firms announce new prices and give reasons
for the change is followed by uniform price increases. This exchange
can help justify the inference of an agreement to fix prices, 119 or in
some cases the exchange itself may be banned as an unreasonable restraint because of its likely anticompetitive effects. 12 0
On the other hand, our physician exchanges might be characterized as the expression of reasons why physicians should individually
make certain moral judgments and undertake consequent actions that
would benefit society.' 2 ' Under this view, there seem to be significant
differences between the exchange of price information and the ex116. For an interesting example of such propaganda, see HMOs versus Ethical Medicine:
Hearingson HA 51 andH 4871 Before the Subcomna on Public Health andEnvironment ofthe
House Comm on InterstateandForeignCommerce 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 265-74 (1973) (statement

of Thomas G. Dorrity).
117. See notes 47-48 supra.
118. See text accompanying note 21 supra.

119. See American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
120. See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
121. The following analysis and its distinction between "reasons" and "means" is suggested
by Professor Scanlon's theory of first amendment protection for certain forms of harmful speech.
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change of reasons for anti-HMO acts. The exchange of price information can have only the purpose of inviting others to follow suit; if they
do not, the speaker will withdraw his price increase for sensible, commercial reasons. The speaker in this situation is only providing others
with the means they need to engage in an illegal act, and there is no
strong reason to provide first amendment protection for this form of
speech. One cannot as easily infer, however, an illegal purpose for our
physician speakers. They simply may be giving reasons for actions
they are taking themselves, and will continue to take whether or not
their colleagues follow. In this situation, though the speech may have
thus
harmful effects, the speakers are not responsible for the effects and
22
first amendment protection for their speech seems appropriate.'
4. General Impact of Professional Restrictions. In concluding
this discussion of professional restrictions on HMOs, it may be noted
that the "more subtle" forms of anticompetitive behavior which seem
likely to survive antitrust scrutiny will be less efficient means of opposition than the concerted refusals to deal which were earlier declared ilegal. 123 The efficacy of these "new" forms of opposition will depend
largely upon the intensity and prevalence of unfavorable attitudes towards HMOs among fee-for-service physicians and the risk of loss to
individual physicians from refusing to deal, factors which may vary
greatly over place and time. Nonetheless, the most significant effect of
this more scattered and less formal opposition may be a very general
one. Physicians, particularly new ones just starting a career, may hesitate to join an HMO because of the potential risk of future damage to
their reputations and careers, however slight the risk may in fact be. 124
Price Discriminationby Hospitals.
In addition to restrictions on hospital admitting privileges and bylaws, non-hospital-based HMOs may suffer a competitive disability because of unfairly high prices for hospital services that they must
C.

See Scanlon, A. Theory fFreedom ofExression, in I PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFFAIRS 204 (1972),

reprintedin THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 153 (R. Dworkin ed. (1977)).
122. Id. 159-60. For a broader and more detailed discussion of this issue, see Havighurst,
ProfessionalRestraintson Innovation in Health Care Financing,1978 DUKE L.J. 303, 355-60. Professor Havighurst would give more weight to antitrust concerns about the harmful effect of such
physician speech than the author has suggested. See id.
123. See notes 30-35 supra and accompanying text.
124. On the importance of personal reputation and contacts for career development by young
physicians, see Hall, Stages in a ProfessionalCareer,in PROFESSIONALIZATION 87 (H. Vollmer &
D. Mills eds. 1966).
In the early 1970s physician recruitment was considered the fourth most significant barrier
(after capital requirements, access to employers and opposition from other providers) to HMO
growth. See McNeil & Schlenker, supranote 12, at 200. This could be explained by the different
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purchase in order to provide comprehensive insurance.' = In this section two different settings in which this price discrimination might occur are considered. The application of substantive antitrust law to these
situations is then examined, and finally the potential applicability of
the Parker v. Brown 12 6 doctrine as a jurisdictional defense is discussed.
Hospitals with substantial market power may view the HMO as an
actual competitor to their own (or their physicians') outpatient services
or to their own HMOs. 2 7 They also may fear the HMO as a potential
competitor in the provision of inpatient care. These hospitals might
charge HMOs prices that are greater than the hospitals' costs of serving
HMO inpatients in three different ways. First, they could refuse to
negotiate special rates with an HMO that has the capability of providing some ancillary inpatient services. Second, hospitals with their own
HMOs might subsidize them by shifting some HMO costs onto all
other patients, including those of the non-hospital-based HMO.12 8 Finally, and most likely, hospitals could discriminate by refusing to give
an HMO the same discount that many Blue Cross plans are able to
obtain for their subscribers.12 9 This latter method, and the possible
reasons for it, merge into the second situation in which non-hospitalbased HMOs may face unfair price discrimination by hospitals.
Non-hospital-based HMOs, and commercial indemnity plans as
well, may be harmed indirectly by the manner in which nonprofit community hospitals arrange to collect their revenues. In many parts of
the country these hospitals and Blue Cross plans negotiate special
"rates" or "costs" for hospital services provided to Blue Cross subscribers.130 The hospitals then attempt to cover "other costs" by setting uniform charges that apply to all other fee-paying patients.' 3 ' The joint
nature of many hospital costs necessarily makes the relationship between the Blue Cross rate and the "costs" of serving Blue Cross subscribers an imprecise one. Furthermore, Blue Cross often will have
substantial buying power vis-h-vis individual hospitals and a general
incentive to keep its own costs down, whether from competition with
forms and apparently somewhat lower economic rewards (in which additional risk might be a
significant factor) provided by HMOs to their physicians. See Note, supra note 2, at 946-49.
125. For examples of IMOs trying to obtain a lower hospital rate equal to that obtained by
Blue Cross, see FTC REPORT 58, 65, 67, 70.

126. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
127. See Havighurst, HMOs 760-66.
128. Id. 760-61.
t
129. See note 125 supra. Cf. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cer .
denied,414 U.S. 1093 (1973) (commercial health insurer complaining of same problem).
130. See notes 125 & 129 supra.
131. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80, 83-84 (3d Cir.), cert.denied, 414 U.S.

1093 (1973).
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other insurers or regulatory pressure. The combined factors suggest
that in many situations hospital rates to Blue Cross may understate the
fair costs of serving Blue Cross subscribers and result in overstated
costs to other patients.
In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross,'32 a commercial insurer
complained that Blue Cross-hospital reimbursement rates had unreasonably shifted hospital costs from Blue Cross subscribers to other feepaying patients. Specifically, the Blue Cross contracts had eliminated
from costs attributable to Blue Cross subscribers all expenses of hospital construction, free care for indigent patients and losses from patient
defaults on payments.' 33 Travelers established at trial that the consequence of this shifting was that hospitals, in order to collect revenues
that covered their total expenses, were charging policyholders of commercial health insurers an average of fourteen to fifteen percent 1more
34
for hospital services than was charged Blue Cross policyholders.
Non-hospital-based HMOs would seem to deserve at least the
same treatment from hospitals that Blue Cross receives. HMO inpatients are no more responsible for a hospital's welfare costs or default
losses than Blue Cross subscribers and, however capital costs are to be
treated, there would seem to be no distinction between these two kinds
of patients. Yet the lesser bargaining power of HMOs combined with
hospitals' need to cover all their expenses could result in higher charges
to HMOs.
1. The Application of PriceDiscriminationLaw. The provisions
of federal antitrust law that explicitly prohibit price discrimination, the
Robinson-Patman Act,1 35 do not apply to the hospital-HMO situation
because of the Act's limitation to sales of "commodities" that are made
"in" interstate commerce.136 Nonetheless, price discrimination against
HMOs by hospitals with substantial market power may be amenable to
attack under section 2 of the Sherman Act as monopolizing conduct.
In certain circumstances other cases of price discrimination by hospitals might be held to constitute a restraint of trade under section 1 or a
conspiracy to monopolize under section 2.
Where inpatient services to HMOs are unfairly priced by hospitals
that have market shares and other characteristics sufficient to establish
132. 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973).
133. 481 F.2d at 82.
134. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 361 F. Supp. 774, 776 (W.D. Pa. 1972).

135. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976).
136. Id § 13(a).
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their monopoly power, 13 7 the price discrimination may be characterized as conduct by a monopolist that has the purpose or likely effect of
excluding actual or potential competition. 138 In other words, the price
discrimination may be viewed as an illegal attempt by the hospital either to protect its monopoly power over inpatient care, by increasing
barriers to entry, or to use monopoly power in the inpatient market to
protect and expand the hospital's power in the market for outpatient
39
services. 1
As Professor Havighurst has noted, 40 this conclusion may be
strengthened by comparing the hospital-HMO situation to that of a
"price-squeeze" by a vertically integrated monopolist, which was held
to violate section 2 of the Sherman Act in United States v. Aluminum
Co. ofAmerica.141 Price squeezing involves a vertically integrated firm
with monopoly power over product X, which it uses to make product Y
and sells to other producers of Y. This firm can "squeeze" its competitors out of business in Y by decreasing the margin between its sale
price on X and its own price on Y to an unprofitable level. By analogy, the price discriminating hospital may be viewed as both selling its
inpatient services (product X) to the non-hospital-based HMO and using its inpatient services as part of more comprehensive services (product Y) that both the hospital and HMO offer to the public. This
analogy certainly is more apt where the hospital operates its own
HMO, 142 but it also seems to offer some precedential support for the
more general situation of price discrimination by monopoly hospi14 3
tals.
Where the price discriminating hospital lacks substantial market
power, it will be more difficult to show antitrust violations by the hospital. For example, where Blue Cross has obtained a discount by reason
of its own buying power, the hospital may in fact need to price its other
services at a higher level in order to cover total costs. In this case the
antitrust attack should be against Blue Cross rather than the hospital, a
137. On establishing the existence of a firm's monopoly power for purposes of section 2 analysis, see L. SULLIVAN §§ 5-32.
138. See id. § 47(d) for a discussion on the use of price discrimination by monopolists gener-

ally as an exclusionary tactic.
139. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 340-41, 349 (D. Mass. 1953), af'dper curiama, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
140. Havighurst, HMOs 761-63.
141. 148 F.2d 416, 436-38 (2d Cir. 1945).
142. Professor Havighurst applied this analogy only to this situation. Havighurst, HMOs
760-66.
143. The general situation is more likely to occur if hospitals continue to show little interest in
developing their own HMOs. As of 1976, only seven hospitals were sponsors of HMOs. FTC
REPORT 115-16.
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possibility which is discussed in the next section. 144 In any event, on
these facts the only antitrust claim available against the hospital would
be an attempt to monopolize charge under section 2 of the Sherman
Act, and this is likely to fail because of the absence of any specific intent to obtain monopoly power. 145 Another possible antitrust situation
may occur when a hospital acting in its role of agent for its fee-forservice medical staff initiates price discrimination against non-hospitalbased HMOs. Obtaining evidence to establish the existence of such a
combination may be very difficult, but if the evidence is available the
price discrimination could be condemned as either a restraint of trade
under section 1 or a conspiracy to monopolize under section 2.
Note that condemning price discrimination against non-hospitalbased HMOs will raise the objection that the remedy of enforcing a
"fair" price for the HMO will turn the antitrust court into a public
utility commission, with the continuous need to assess the full range of
changing hospital costs and what part should be allocated to the
HMO. 146 The problem of administering "fair" hospital prices for
HMOs would seem to be a formidable one, 14 7 except where Blue Cross
is already obtaining a discount for its subscribers. 148 In this situation
the court simply could rule that the HMO is prima facie entitled to the
Blue Cross rate and place the burden on the hospital to prove any additional costs that fairly should be allocated to HMO patients. In other
situations, which may not be very frequent, the better approach may be
to recognize the theoretical nature of the objection and to trust that the
initial court order will produce relatively
amicable negotiations as to
149
price between the HMO and hospital.
2. Parker v. Brown Defenses. In several situations price discriminating hospitals may be able to raise, as a jurisdictional defense,
the Parkerdoctrine that antitrust laws do not apply to anticompetitive
acts of state governments. 150 First, several states have established public regulation of all hospital rates' 5' or, under HMO enabling statutes,
144. See text accompanying notes 178-315 infra.
145. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905).
146. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 349 (D. Mass. 1953),
afdper curiam;, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 125-27
(1959).
147. See Havighurst, HMOs 762.
148. See text accompanying notes 129-34 supra.
149. See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 146, at 127.
150. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-52. See generally Blumstein & Calvani, Sale Action As A
Shield and-4 Sword In A MedicalServices Antitrust Context: Parker v. Brown In Constitutional
Perspective, 1978 DUKE L.J. 389.
151. See Lewin, Somers & Somers, Stale Health Cost Regulation:StruclureandAdministrallon,
6 U. TOLEDO L. REv. 647, 658 (1975).
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have provided for state regulation of hospital-HMO rates.152 These
laws provide non-hospital-based HMOs with an alternative and probably exclusive forum in which to challenge unfair price discrimination
by hospitals. Should a state agency approve price discrimination
against HMOs under either of these kinds of laws, the discriminating
hospital would appear to have a good Parkerdefense even as this defense has been refined and narrowed by the Supreme Court's recent

decisions in Goldfarb.53 and Cantor v. DetroitEdison Co.154
In Goldfarb the Court held that anticompetitive activity by either a
"state agency"' 55 or a private organization must be "required by the
State acting as sovereign" before the Parkerdefense can apply. 156 Activities that merely "complemented" or were "prompted" by a regulatory scheme did not satisfy this threshold test.157 In Cantor the Court
held that the Parker defense did not apply to an electric power company's free distribution of light bulbs, even though costs of the distribution program were included in the company's tariff which the state
regulatory commission had approved, and compliance with which was
required until a new tariff was approved. A majority of the Court'
justified this decision on grounds that the defendant power company
could prove neither that the state had played a "dominant" role in the
decision to approve inclusion of light bulb costs within the tariff 5 9 nor
that the regulatory action was "necessary" to accomplish the purposes
of Michigan's act to regulate the electric power industry.160 As stated
by the Court, the second part of this test is that the antitrust exemption
must be "necessary to make the regulatory act work and even then only
to the minimum extent necessary," which is the same test that is used
by antitrust courts for an implied antitrust immunity under federal reg16 1

ulatory statutes.

Cantor's incorporation of a "necessity" test into the Parker doctrine appears to invite antitrust courts to second guess state regulatory
152. See Kissam & Johnson, State HMO Laws 53.

153. 421 U.S. at 788-93.
154. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).

See also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).

155. The "state agency" in Goldfarbwas the Virginia State Bar Association, which was organized by state law to serve as an administrative arm of the Virginia Supreme Court. 421 U.S. at

776 n.2.
156. Id. at 587.
157. Id.
158. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Justices Brennan, Marshall and
White joined in the opinion, and Chief Justice Burger joined in the part under discussion here.

428 U.S. at 581. In addition, Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion, id at 605-14, employs a
preemption doctrine analysis that is similar to that discussed in the text.
159. Id. at 592-95.

160. Id at 595-98.
161.

Id at 596-97.
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decisions.' 6 2 Yet future applications of the necessity test in Parkersituations may and arguably should be carefully limited to factual situations like those in Cantor. In holding that the state regulatory action
concerning light bulb distribution was not necessary to implement ef-

fective regulation of the electric power industry, the Court seems to
have relied heavily on the unregulated nature of the fight bulb market
and the state agency's lack of expertise or statewide policy regarding

free light bulb distributions and their relation to electric power sales.

63

Cantor's rationale thus can be characterized as the refusal to extend

Parkerimmunity to peripheral state regulatory action for which no rational justification is offered by the state. Reading Cantorin this nar-

row way would appear appropriate for three reasons: the present
Court's apparent propensity for narrow readings of prior cases,' 64 the

policy of keeping antitrust courts out of direct public utility regulation 65 and the need to preserve room for state regulatory operations
166
under our constitutional principle of federalism.

If Cantoris so limited, state agency approval of price discrimina67
tion by hospitals against HMOs should obtain Parker protection.
This state approval, with the typical requirement that the approved rate
be followed until changed, would appear to satisfy Goldfarb's preliminary test for some state command.'68 In addition, the close relationship between the approved rate and the state's regulation of all hospital
rates or all hospital-HMO
dealings should satisfy Cantor's qualified
169
"necessity" test.

162. Cantor in effect employs preemption doctrine analysis to limit the scope of the Parker
doctrine. For a taste of the academic debate prior to Cantor on the advisability of such a shift,
compare Posner, The ProperRelationshipBetween State Regulation and the FederalAntitrust Laws,
49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 693 (1974) and Note, Parker v. Brown: A PreemptionAnalysis, 84 YALE L.J.
1164 (1975) with Handler, The CurrentAttack on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine,76
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1976) and Verkuil, State Action, Due Processand Antitrust: Reflections on
Parker v. Brown, 75 COLOM. L. REv. 328 (1975).
163. See 428 U.S. at 584-85, 595-98.
164. For a good example, see the CantorCourt's reading of Parker.Id at 585-92.
165. See, for example, text accompanying notes 146-49 supra.
166. See Verkuil, supra note 162. My own preference for this "federalism" approach is
based on the value of giving weight to constraining constitutional principles in "hard cases" of
statutory interpretation. See note 71 supra. Of course, the competing "preemption" approach, see
note 162 supra and accompanying text, rests fundamentally on another constitutional principle,
the supremacy clause, but it seems appropriate to give this competing principle weight only when
Congress has indicated some intent for a particular statute to limit state action. The legislative
history of the Sherman Act provides no such indication. See Parker,317 U.S. at 350-51. See
also Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 150, at 395-431, where more weight is given to the
supremacy clause than to the federalism principle.
167. Professors Blumstein and Calvani might arrive at the same result under their broader
reading of Cantor. See Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 150, at 424-28.
168. See text accompanying notes 156-57 supra.
169. Cantor arguably may be interpreted as requiring both a "dominant" state role in the
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Second, public hospitals also might try to defend price discrimination under the Parker doctrine on the theory that their price discrimination is state-authorized as part of their general authority to operate a
monopoly public service.' 70 The Supreme Court's recent decision in
City of Lafayette v. LouisianaPower & Light Co.' 7 1 suggests, however,
that this defense will be a difficult one to maintain. In this case five
justices rejected an argument by municipally-owned public utilities that
the Parkerdoctrine exempts all anticompetitive acts by political subdivisions of a state. Four justices concluded that the Parkerexemption
applies only if the state has "authorized or directed" anticompetitive
conduct by a political subdivision.1 72 Such authority need not be "specific" or "detailed" and may exist "when it is found from the authority
given a governmental entity to operate in a particular area, that the
legislature contemplated the kind of activity complained of.'1 73 Chief
Justice Burger concurred in the Court's judgment, but he relied on the
different theory that the Parkerexemption should not apply automatically to "proprietary" activities of political subdivisions.174 Price discrimination by public hospitals probably would be subject to antitrust
scrutiny under either of these tests. Price discrimination is not logically connected to hospital operations, and thus legislatures are not
likely to have "contemplated" price discrimination while authorizing
public hospitals. Additionally, the fact that private entities operate
hospitals suggests, at least for antitrust purposes, that public hospitals
would be classified as "proprietary" enterprises under the Chief Jus-

tice's approach.

75

Third, some states have chosen to regulate hospital rates in a selective manner, providing state agency review only for hospital rates to
regulation (which might not be present in the price discriminating hospital situation) and a showing of "necessity" in order for the Parkerdefense to apply. See L. SULLIVAN § 238a. However,
the Court's opinion in Cantortreated these two issues as providing "quite different reasons" for an

antitrust immunity, 428 U.S. at 592, which suggests that either condition is sufficient for Parkerto
apply.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978).
Id.
Id. at 1137.
Id. at 1138.
Id. at 1139.
The Chief Justice's concurring opinion does not contain a clear antitrust test for "propri-

etary" governmental activities, but it does suggest that if competitors of the municipal enterprise
may be subjected to antitrust claims then the municipal enterprise also ought to be subject to
similar claims. Id at 1140. Cf. Note, -TheAntitrust Liability of Municpalities Under the Parker

Doctrine,57 BOSTON L. REV. 368, 384-86 (1977) (using an approach similar to that of the Chief
Justice and arguing that proprietary municipal enterprises should be those providing the same
kinds of services as private entities and capable of aggregating and exercising the kinds of power

which, in the private sector, are the concern of antitrust law).
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Blue Cross and/or the state Medicaid program.1 76 In this situation a
hospital that grants a rate discount to Blue Cross but not to an HMO

might attempt to defend its rate structure under the Parkerdoctrine as
behavior required in effect by a command of the state rate agency. It

certainly is conceivable that particular hospitals may be forced into a
discriminatory rate structure because of selective rate review by a state

agency. Moreover, in theory at least the HMO would have access to
the state regulatory agency for redress of the situation. Nonetheless,
the state command in this case does not apply directly to the hospital-

HMO rate negotiation, and in view of the recent narrowing of the
Parker doctrine this defense most likely should and would be re1 77
jected.
D.

Restrictive Activities by Insurance Companies.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans, with their relatively large market shares to protect, 178 and defensive HMOs, which are employed to

protect the interests of their fee-for-service sponsors, 179 might engage in
a variety of anticompetitive acts toward other HMOs.' 80 Three kinds
of anticompetitive acts seem most likely: refusals by Blue plans to supply certain services to HMOs or their physicians, various types of anticompetitive pricing and the formation of defensive HMOs with an
intent to exclude or deter competition by more aggressive ones. In this
section, the issue of assessing the market power of the Blues and defen-

sive HMOs will be considered. The application of antitrust law to the
three types of anticompetitive behavior will then be analyzed, followed

by a discussion of two jurisdictional defenses that may be raised to protect some of these acts.
176. See Lewin, Somers & Somers, supra note 151, at 658.
177. Selective hospital rate review also may be effected indirectly by state regulation of Blue
Cross plans and their negotiations with hospitals for subscriber rates. Id This review might
"force" hospitals to discriminate against non-hospital-based HMOs. See text accompanying notes
125-34 supra. A hospital might try to defend its action under the McCarran-Ferguson Act antitrust exemption for state regulated insurance activities by claiming that its high price to an HMO
is both part of the insurance business and in effect required by state regulation (of Blue Cross and
possibly the HMO as well). By analogy to the Parker issue discussed in the text, this claim
probably should and would be rejected because the state regulation in question does not apply to
the hospital-HMO rate. Cf. Ohio v. Ohio Medical Indem., Inc. [1976-2] TRADE RnO. REP. (CCH)
1 61,128 (S.D. Ohio, Sept. 16, 1976) (a McCarran-Ferguson claim by a state medical society that
owned a Blue Shield plan rejected).
178. See J. KRizAY & A. WILsON, supra note 19, at 3.
179. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
180. Commercial insurers might engage in these acts as well, but these companies typically
have relatively small market shares in particular communities, seeJ.KRIZAY & A. WILSON, supra
note 19, at 3, and they are not as dependent as HMOs on maintaining any minimum share. They
thus would seem to have much less incentive and to be in a much weaker position to engage in
potentially costly anticompetitive acts. See Havighurst, HMOs 771.
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1. The Showing of MarketPower. In many instances successful
antitrust attacks on restrictive insurance company behavior toward
HMOs will have to establish that the behavior constitutes monopolization or an attempt to monopolize, both of which are prohibited by section 2 of the Sherman Act.18 A necessary element of monopolization is
proof of the defendant's monopoly power.182 This term has been defined by the Supreme Court as "the power to exclude competition,"' 183 a
more precise restatement of which might be "a substantialdegree of

power 4to exclude competitors by reducing price, and still be profita18
ble."
Proof that a defendant has some degree of market power may be

important and often necessary in establishing an attempt to monopolize. The existence of market power can help characterize particular
conduct (for example, price discrimination or exclusive dealing) as conto monopolize, 8 5 the
duct from which one may infer a specific intent 86
minimally essential element in proving attempts.' A showing that the
defendant possesses some market power will be necessary where the
antitrust court requires, as a second element, that there be some "dan-

power would have been achieved
gerous probability" that monopoly
187
had the attempt succeeded.

Proof of market power in section 2 cases typically involves a twopart analysis, which consists of defining the relevant market and assessing a party's power within that market in terms of relative market
to
shares, the relative strengths and weaknesses of competitors, barriers 188
entry, and other structural, conduct and performance evidence.

Several observations about health insurance markets are relevant in applying this analysis to antitrust litigation designed to protect HMOs
from unfair behavior.
181. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 422-32 (2d Cir.
1945); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342-45 (D. Mass. 1953), aI'd
per cur/am, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
183. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948).
184. L. SULLIVAN § 22 (emphasis supplied). See Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane
Case, 70 HARV. L. REV. 281, 302 (1956).
185. See L. SULLWAN § 15(a).
186. See id. §§ 50-52.
187. Several circuit courts have required this second element. See P. AREEDA, supra note
115, at 273(b) n.83. The Ninth Circuit is an apparent major exception. See Lessig v. Tidewater
Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,377 U.S. 993 (1964). On the academic debate
over whether this second requirement to prove an attempt is justified, compareL. SULLIVAN
51(b) & 52 and Turner, supra note 184, at 305, with Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization 4
Mildly Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MICH. L. REv. 373
(1973).
188. See L. SULLIVAN §§ 12-32.
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First, assuming for a moment that all health insurance is the relevant product market, in many areas of the country Blue Cross and Blue
Shield plans do not compete with each other; they sell only hospital
and medical insurance respectively, and have market shares of fifty
percent or more that could be considered sufficient to support findings
of monopoly power. 189 In other areas, typically the western states, the
Blues have smaller although still relatively large market shares, and
may compete with each other in the sale of comprehensive hospitaland-medical insurance.' 9 0 In most instances, however, their competi-

tors have relatively insignificant market shares,'9 1 and the Blues often
have been successful in differentiating their product from that of competitors through advertising and the development of customer loyalty.19 2 Thus, the Blues often have substantial market power regardless
of the size of their shares in a particular market. Moreover, the recent
but gradual decline in the Blues' share of private health insurance
sales' 93 does not necessarily negate the existence of substantial market
power. As Professor Posner notes,1 94 a monopoly price creates incentives for new sellers to enter, and the monopolist may choose to maintain its price and suffer a decline in its market share as the best means
of obtaining some monopoly profits. The nonprofit Blues do not, of
course, obtain monopoly profits directly in an easily measurable form;
their monopoly "profits" occur in the form of excess administrative and
provider costs, and perhaps in the subsidization of some subscribers
under community rating plans.' 95
Second, the assumption that all health insurance sales constitute
the relevant product market may not be valid. Commercial health inmarket
surers were excluded from the definition of the relevant product 96
Such
1
Society
Medical
County
King
v.
Cooperative
in Group Health
exlusion often may be appropriate in view of supply and demand considerations, which suggest that commercial insurers frequently do not
189. See, e.g., FTC REPORT 52, 60-62, 66. On the size of relative market shares that courts

traditionally have required to support findings of monopoly power, see United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) ("it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four
percent would be enough") and L. SULLIVAN § 22.
FTC REPORT 72, 84, 91.
190. See, e.g.,
191. See id 14.
S. LAW, supra note 74, at 111 n.614.
192. See, e.g.,
193. See id. 11.
194. See R. POSNER, supra note 19, at 215.
195. Initially, community rating for all subscribers, as opposed to separate rates based on the
health cost experiences of different groups, was an essential feature of the Blue plans, but today
the Blues have moved to greater use of experience rating as a competitive response to commerical
insurers. See FTC REPORT 15; S. LAW, supra note 74, at 11-12.
196. 39 Wash. 2d 586, 637-38, 237 P.2d 737, 764-65 (1951).

Vol. 1978:487]

HEALTH MAINTENAINCE ORGANIZATIONS

523

compete effectively with provider reimbursement plans like the Blues
and HMOs. On the supply side, commercial insurers, which typically
offer subscriber indemnity plans, lack an ability to compete by implementing cost reductions through systematic provider controls. 197 In
terms of demand, commercial insurers may attract a different class of
subscribers because of their restricted benefits, more liberal use of deduction and copayment provisions and substantially lower premiums.19 8 Even if this alternative market definition is not accepted, these
arguments still serve to strengthen any showing of the Blues' market
power in a more broadly defined market.
Another consideration in establishing a defendant's market power
in HMO cases may be the barriers to HMO entry that exist under federal and state HMO laws and the certificate-of-need provisions of the
Health Planning and Resources Development Act.1 99 These barriers
restrict only some entrants into health insurance markets, but they are
significant because they restrict those that potentially are most effi2
cient. 00
2. Refusals to Deal. Blue Shield and Blue Cross plans may restrain HMO development by refusing to enter into certain vertical relationships with HMOs or their physicians. Blue Shield plans at times
have refused to reimburse part-time HMO physicians for services provided to their fee-for-service patients who are Blue Shield subscribers.20 1 Where Blue Shield provides medical insurance for a relatively
substantial portion of such patients, this refusal to deal may dampen
the incentive of physicians to work for HMOs, thereby increasing barriers to HMO entry. Blue Cross plans at times have refused to provide
new or prospective HMOs with reinsurance, marketing and administrative services at a reasonable price. 20 2 In some instances these services
can also be obtained from commercial health insurers, 0 3 but Blue
Cross provision of the services may have particular value to HMOs
because of lower costs, Blue Cross' greater penetration of and experience in a particular market and the attractiveness to consumers of Blue
197. FTC REPORT 16.
198. See M. ROEMER, supra note 10, at 14-17.
199. Barriers to HMO entry under federal and state HMO laws are discussed in notes 47-48
supra. The Health Planning and Resources Development Act and the possibility of undue barriers to HMO entry thereunder are discussed in the text at notes 297-308 infra.
200. See text accompanying notes 9-15 supra.
201. See Group Health Coop. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 596-98, 237
P.2d 737, 744-45 (1951); Medical Serv. Corp., [1976] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) T 21,195 (FTC
Consent Order, Sept. 15, 1976).
202. See FTC REPORT 40, 47; S. LAW, supra note 74, at 110-11.
203. See FTC REPORT 47; Havighurst, HMOs 790.
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Cross hospital insurance as part of their HMO policy."° Thus Blue
Cross refusals to deal also may increase barriers to HMO entry.
Blue Shield's denial of coverage to part-time HMO physicians is
subject to attack on alternative grounds either as a restraint of trade or
as monopolizing behavior. There are only two plausible explanations
for this conduct. First, Blue Shield might have entered into a combination with its participating fee-for-service physicians to protect them
from HMO competition, a group boycott that is clearly illegal under
section 1 of the Sherman Act.2 °5 Second, absent any evidence of combination, Blue Shield's behavior as an independent firm, resulting in
more limited services to its subscribers, seems explicable only as conduct by a powerful firm that is aimed at excluding competitors. In this
situation Blue Shield may be characterized as a firm with substantial
market power over a relatively unique resource (financing patient bills)
which it provides to some physicians but not to those who represent a
competitive threat to Blue Shield itself. Section 2 of the Sherman Act
imposes an obligation upon such monopolists to deal with their competitors .20 Therefore, a section 2 analysis will falter only if Blue
Shield's market share is not large enough to support a finding of monopoly power and the antitrust court insists upon a showing that monopoly power would have resulted from a successful attempt in order
to establish an "attempt to monopolize" violation. 0 7
Blue Cross refusals to deal with HMOs present a more difficult
antitrust issue if the services desired by an HMO are not provided to
others at an established market price. A monopolist's obligation to
serve competitors under section 2 has not been extended to cover this
situation.20 8 Judicial reluctance to interfere with a business firm's judgment 20 9 and judicial unwillingness to engage in direct public utility regulation to determine a "reasonable" price 210 appear sound reasons for
rejecting such an extension. Moreover, unlike the case of a monopoly
hospital that discriminates in prices charged to non-hospital-based
HMOs, 21 I HMOs probably can obtain these services from commercial
health insurers, albeit at some higher price.
In some areas Blue Cross may be selling reinsurance, marketing
204. See S. LAW, supra note 74, at 110; Eilers, The Implications of HMOs for Private
Insurers, 10 INQUIRY, Mar. 1973, at 59-63.
205. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See text accompanying notes 77-81 supra.
206. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
207. See note 187 supra and accompanying text.
208. See generallyL. SULLIVAN § 48; Cooper, supra note 187, at 440-43.
209. See Cooper, supra note 187, at 440-41.

210. See generallyL. SULLIVAN
211.

§§ 4748. See text accompanying notes 14649 supra.

See text accompanying notes 14649 supra.
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and administrative services to other, more friendly, HMOs, 21 2 and in
many states Blue Cross hospital insurance rates are subject to regulation by state insurance departments. 1 3 In these situations, if Blue
Cross can be shown to have monopoly power, HMOs should have a
obtain Blue Cross services
right under section 2 of the Sherman Act to 214
basis.
reasonable
or
on a nondiscriminatory
3. Anticompetitive Pricing. The Blues and defensive HMOs
might engage in a variety of pricing practices designed to deter entry or
discourage aggressive competition by other HMOs. Such practices include exclusive dealing, where the insurer offers a group contract to an
employer or union only on condition that a certain percentage of employees or members elect to be covered by the contract, 215 and price
discrimination, where customers sought by competitor HMOs are offered lower prices than other customers. 1 6 Also included are belowcost (predatory) pricing or promotion 1 7 and "entry limiting" pricing,
in which prices are lowered below the short-run profit-maximizing
level in an effort to discourage entry by HMOs. 218 These practices
may be attacked under section 2 as monopolizing conduct and, in some
cases, also under section 1 as a restraint of trade.
Exclusive dealing contracts with customers, price discrimination
that favors certain customers and predatory pricing or promotion all
may constitute monopolizing conduct by a firm with substantial market
power. 2 19 Each of these charges, however, involves substantial
problems of proof in distinguishing between behavior that is exclusionary in intent or effect and behavior that is legitimately competitive.220
These problems may be even more difficult in antitrust cases against
insurance companies because it will be necessary to show that the
prices or coverage conditions on group contracts offered to particular
groups are, as an actuarial matter, not related to the expected health
care costs of the group to be covered.
Tackling this problem, however, could be worth the effort, given
particular incentives that state-wide Blue Cross/Blue Shield programs
212. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
213. See S.LAW, supra note 74, at 13-18.
214. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Associated Press v.
United States, 316 U.S. 1 (1945); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
215. See Havighurst, HMOs774; Schneider, Model ConsumerHealth Maintenance Organization Act and Commentary, 6 RuT-CAM. L. RaV. 266, 287 n.55 (1974).
216. See Schneider, supra note 215, at 287 n.55.
217. Id.
218. See Havighurst, HMOs 772.
219. For citations to the relevant case law, see Cooper, supra note 187, at 435-40, 445-48.
220. See L. SULLIVAN §§ 47, 163-168. See generaly Areeda & Turner, supra note 19.
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or relatively large medical care foundations (MCFs) 22 1 may have for
engaging in these practices. The position of these plans vis-h-vis individual HMOs attempting to enter particular communities seems to satisfy the theoretical conditions for cost-effective and thus desirable
predatory behavior by a monopolist. Predatory activities by a monopolist generally should be relatively infrequent because of the cost of
such activities to the monopolist, even where the monopolist has relatively greater resources than its competitors. A large, multi-market
health insurance plan, however, may be able to engage in relatively
inexpensive predation against HMOs. It may do so if it can establish a
credible "threat" of predation in all its markets by engaging in costly
predatory practices in a few selected markets that HMOs initially try to
2
22

enter.

The unique position of Blue Cross in negotiating for Blue Cross
subscriber rates at hospitals also may produce an indirect form of predatory pricing that disadvantages HMOs. As described above,22 3 these
negotiations may shift some Blue Cross "costs" onto other hospital feepaying patients. This would result in "below-cost" Blue Cross insurance premiums and unfairly high costs to non-hospital-based HMOs.
The major substantive problem with attacking this form of anticompetitive pricing may be the difficulty in proving bad purposes or harmful
effects. The Blue Cross program to obtain discounts is likely to have
been engaged in as part of an overall "cost control" effort by Blue
Cross and to cover a fairly broad geographical
area, making it difficult
224
to prove harmful purposes or effects.
Since exclusive dealing with customers involves an agreement between seller and buyer, such behavior that adversely affects HMOs also
may be attacked as a restraint of trade.225 Price discrimination and
predatory pricing against HMOs by medical society-sponsored MCFs
(or Blue Shield organizations controlled by physicians) could be attacked similarly if an agreement among physician sponsors to engage
in such acts can be established. Formally, restraint of trade analysis
would obviate the need to prove the existence of a defendant's monopoly or near-monopoly power, although a showing of substantial market
221. MCFs, which are sponsored by state and county medical societies, are described in note
19 supra.
222. See R. POSNER, supra note 19, at 223-25.

223. See text accompanying notes 130-34 supra.
224. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80, 94 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,414 U.S.

1093 (1973). Of course, an HMO, with its subscriber enrollment concentrated in one geographic
area, may be in a better position than a commercial insurer to show harmful effects from a Blue
Cross discount.
225. See FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
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power still may help to establish the harmful effects or purposes of
these alleged restraints.2 2 6

Finally, the Blues or defensive HMOs might employ entry limiting
pricing against independent HMOs, but it is questionable whether the
Sherman Act would be applied to prohibit such behavior. It has been
argued that limit pricing by a monopolist "has the explicit purpose and
likely effect of inhibiting entry" and may leave "traces discernible to

discovery processes." 27 Limit pricing by MCFs or Blue Shield plans
controlled by physicians also can be compared to maximum price
fixing agreements by competitors,228 which generally are considered to
be per se illegal because of their entry limiting effect as well as their
potential for disguising minimum price fixing agreements. 229 There are,

however, some persuasive reasons for not applying the Sherman Act to
such instances of limit pricing. Professors Areeda and Turner point out
that limit pricing represents "competition on the merits" because it excludes only relatively inefficient entrants whose costs are above the

limit price. 23 In addition, limit pricing by MCFs may be viewed as an
essential part of a legitimate joint venture among physicians to control
escalating costs. 231 These reasons, as well as the considerable practical

difficulties in administering a prohibitory rule, would appear to be relatively strong justification for not applying the Sherman Act to ban limit
pricing against HMOs.
4. Defensive HMOs: Monopolization and Joint Venture Issues.
The very organization of defensive HMOs by medical societies, the
Blues or hospitals in order to deter independent HMOs might be sub226. See id Cf.Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) (emphasizing
the importance of a defendant's market power in establishing harmful effects of an exclusive dealing agreement under section 3 of the Clayton Act).
227. L. SULLIVAN § 47(c).
228. Havighurst, HMOs 773-76. But see note 231 infra and accompanying text. MCFs, in
essence, are combinations of physicians who agree to market a substantial portion of their services
to insureds through a joint selling agency and who agree not to charge this agency more than
certain maximum fees. See note 19 supra.
229. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); L. SULLIVAN §§ 77-78.
230. Areeda & Turner, supra note 19, at 705-06.
231. The general legitimacy of using MCFs to control escalating health care costs has been
sanctioned by Congress through its endorsement of MCF development under the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-l(5) (Supp. v. 1975). A legitimate business
purpose for a joint selling agency supports application of a rule of reason analysis rather than a
per se rule to just selling agents. See L. SULLIVAN § 77. Under a rule of reason approach, the same
kinds of arguments that apply to limit pricing by a monopolist would appear to be applicable to
limit pricing by MCFs. But see Kalistrom, Health Care Cost ControlBy Third-PartyPayors:Fee
Schedules andthe Sherman Act, 1978 DUKE L.J. 645, 650-81, who does not consider congressional
endorsement of MCFs in his analysis.
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jected to two types of antitrust analysis. 232 First, where the sponsor of
the defensive HMO possesses substantial market power, the organization of the HMO might be characterized as exclusionary conduct by a
monopolist that is analogous to the "fighting ship" or "fighting brand"
tactics that have been employed in other industries to insulate the
predator's established product from the higher costs of general predatory pricing.233 The essential difficulty with this approach lies with the
problem of distinguishing anticompetitive HMO formation by fee-forservice institutions from the development of better products and the
advisability of applying the Sherman Act to ban development of better
products by a monopolist. Blue plans and hospitals that sponsor HMOs
can claim quite easily that their HMOs are intended to improve the
234
efficiency of their operations and to offer the public a better product.
Any exclusionary effect on other HMOs, according to this argument,
should be considered merely an incidental side effect of competition on
the merits.
Second, where the defensive HMO is an MCF or is operated as a
combination of health insurer or hospital and some significant group of
physicians, the organization of the HMO might be characterized as a
"joint venture" that is designed to limit actual or potential competition
and therefore subject to section 1 as well as section 2 of the Sherman
Act.235 In addition to exclusion of more independent, aggressive
HMOs, anticompetitive restraints that might be caused by these joint
ventures include limitation of previous competition among competitors
(as with the formation of MCFs by fee-for-service physicians), 236 the
foreclosure of the joint venture's parents entering their own more independent HMOs into the insurance market, 237 and restraint of competition between the joint venture HMO and either or both of its
232. The basic nature of defensive HMOs is described in note 19 supra. For more extensive
discussion of the issues noted in this section, see Competition in the Health Services Market, supra

note 25, at 1069-85 (statement of Clark C. Havighurst); Havighurst, HMOs 766-77; Havighurst,
supra note 4, at 257-62.
233. See Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen, Inc., 356 U.S. 481, 488 (1958); Patterson v.
United States, 222 F. 599, 612-13 (6th Cir.), cert.denied, 238 U.S. 635 (1915); Cooper, supra note
187, at 446 n. 269.

234. Both the Blues and hospitals might analogize their formation of HMOs to "vertical integration forward": the Blues into the business of providing services, and hospitals into the business
of providing comprehensive inpatient and outpatient services. Such internal expansion generally
has been assumed to be legal. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379-80
(1967); Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 315-21 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
235. See generally Pitofsky, Joint Ventures Under theAntitrust Laws: Some Reltections on the
Signocance of Penn-Olin, 82 HARv.L. REv. 1007 (1969).
236. Havighurst, HMOs 774. See notes 228-29 supra and accompanying text.

237. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
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parents.238 These additional restraints which may be present with joint
venture defensive HMOs suggest that joint venture analysis under Section 1 may be a much more fruitful line of inquiry in this area than
monopolization analysis under Section 2.
5. The McCarran-FergusonExemption. The McCarran-Ferguson Act's partial exemption from federal antitrust law for state regulated insurance activities 239 may protect much anticompetitive behavior
by insurance companies. The relative breadth of the exemption2 40 and
the widespread nature of state regulation of health insurance 24 1 indicate that anticompetitive pricing by insurers against HMOs and the organization and operation of defensive HMOs may be exempt from
federal antitrust scrutiny in most instances. On the other hand, Blue
plan refusals to deal with HMOs or their physicians and certain types
of exclusive dealing contracts may not be protected.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act limits the application of federal antitrust law "to the business of insurance to the extent that such business
is not regulated by State law,"24 2 with the important exception that the
Sherman Act remains applicable to any agreement or act of "boycott,
coercion, or intimidation. 24 3 In the absence of further definition of
these terms by Congress, 244 they have been the subject of some interesting judicial interpretations that will be of critical importance in antitrust litigation designed to protect HMOs from anticompetitive
behavior by other insurers.
In SEC v. NationalSecurities,Inc.245 the Supreme Court provided
a general definition of "the business of insurance." This definition requires that an insurance company activity be part of or closely related
to the "relationship between insurer and insured," in other words, that
it relate to the company's "status as [a] reliable insurer." 246 This limiting definition has been used to exclude from "the business of insurance" such activities as the provision of information to prospective
238. Havighurst, HMOs 777. See United States v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 193 F.
Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'don other grounds, 371 U.S. 296 (1963).

239. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976).
240. See generally Note, The McCarran-FergusonAct: A Timefor Procompetitive Reform, 29
VAND. L. REv. 1271, 1277-86 (1976).
241. See Hanson, The PrivateInsuranceIndustry and State Insurance RegulatoryActivities as
Alternatives to FederallyEnacted Comprehensive NationalHealth InsuranceLegislation, 6 U. ToLEDO L. REV.677, 695-713 (1975).
242. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976).
243. Id § 1013(b).
244. See Note, supra note 240, at 1277.

245. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
246. Id at 460.
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shareholders,24 7 a merger between two interstate insurance compa-

nies248 and the sale of goods not closely related to the sale of insurance.249 Direct interference with another insurance company's
operations 250 and an insurer's purchase of goods not closely related to
the insurer-insured relationship 5 ' also have not qualified for the exemption.252
The McCarran-Ferguson provision that the challenged insurance
company activity must be "regulated by State law" has been interpreted quite liberally. 53 The most general sorts of standards
247. Id
248. See American Gen. Ins. Co. v. FTC, 359 F. Supp. 887, 896-97 (S.D. Tex. 1973), afl'd,
496 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1974).
249. See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 259 U.S. 65 (1959). Compare
Fry v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1151 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (tie of insurance
sales to loans was "only incidental" to loan agreements to which antitrust laws could apply) with
Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soe'y of the United States, 503 F.2d 725, 728 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975) (tie of insurance sales to loans was part of the "business of
insurance") and Commander Leasing Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 477 F.2d 77 (10th Cir.
1973) (sale of an abstract of title together with title insurance is all part of the "business of insurance"). See generally Comment, The McCarran 4ct's Antitrust Exemptionfor "the Business of
Insurance"-A Shrinking Umbrella, 43 TENN. L. REV. 329, 341-58 (1976).
250. See American Family Life Assurance Co. v. Planned Marketing Assocs., 389 F. Supp.
1141, 1146 (E.D. Va. 1974).
251. See Hill v. National Auto Glass Co., 293 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
252. Significantly, three circuit court decisions have split over the issue of whether an insurer's purchase of goods or services are within "the business of insurance" when the cost of such
purchases is a substantial part of the insurance premium. CompareProctor v. State Farm Mutual
Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977), petitionfor cert..filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3375 (U.S. Oct.
19, 1977) (No. 77-580) (purchase of automobile repair services are part of the business of insurance) andTravelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80, 82-83 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,414 U.S. 1093
(1973) (Blue Cross purchase of hospital services are part of the business of insurance) with Royal
Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977) cert. granted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3541 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1978) (No. 77-952) (Blue Shield's purchases of drugs are not part of
the business of insurance). This split could be resolved, perhaps, by noting the presence of fairly
extensive state insurance department regulation over the purchase activities in the two cases which
held the purchases to be part of the business of insurance. See Travelers, 481 F.2d at 83-84;
Proctor,406 F. Supp. at 30-31. By contrast, insurance department regulation over the insurer's
purchase activities in the third case was much less specific and arguably nonexistent. See Royal
Drug, 415 F. Supp. at 345-46. In Royal Drug the Fifth Circuit distinguished Travelers on the
basis of extensive state regulation over Blue Cross' purchase of hospital services. 556 F.2d at
1382-83. While the definition of "the business of insurance" under McCarran-Ferguson is a
question of federal law, see SEC. v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459-61 (1969), it seems
appropriate to give weight to a state insurance department's judgment on this matter, particularly
in view of Congress' basic intent behind the McCarran-Ferguson Act to support state regulatory
activities in the insurance field. The Supreme Court so interpreted Congress' basic intent in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429 (1946). See also text accompanying notes 253-63
supra. For a more detailed discussion and different analysis of this issue concerning an insurer's
purchase of goods or services, see Weller, The McCarran-Ferguson,4ct's,4ntitrustExemption For
Insurance Language, History andPolicy, 1978 DuKE L.J 587.
253. See Note, supranote 240, at 1284-85.
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governing the insurance business' s and the mere authorization of regulation by statute rather than effective regulation 255 have been held to
satisfy this condition. In a leading recent case, Ohio AFL-CIO v. InsuranceRatingBoard,25 6 the Sixth Circuit stated the test to be "whether

the state has 'generally authorized or permitted certain standards of
conduct.'

"257

Moreover, the state regulatory statute that triggers the

McCarran-Ferguson exemption may be other than an insurance
statute 258 and, in any event, the regulatory statute need not contain

259
prohibitions or remedies similar to those in federal antitrust laws.
At first glance, the liberal interpretation of "state regulation" may

appear inconsistent with recent judicial narrowing of the "business of

insurance" term.260 The inconsistency disappears, however, when one
considers the two-part rationale that seems to have motivated Congress

in passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act. One part of the rationale is
that insurers may need an exemption from antitrust laws to engage in
activities such as price-fixing, loss pooling, reinsurance and information
exchanges that can help maintain their financial solvency and status as
"reliable insurers. '261 This justifies limiting the exemption to insur-

ance company activities closely related to ratemaking and other insurer-insured relationships.

The other part of the Act's rationale is

that the states should have discretion to determine whether an antitrust
exemption should be established.

Apparently, this discretion was

granted because of the states' proximity to the insurance industry's
problems and their prior experience in regulating the industry. 262 This
reasoning, together with Congress' failure to specify standards for the

kind of state regulation that triggers the exemption, suggests that Congress also intended to leave states with discretion to determine the na254. See, e.g., FTC v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560, 564-65 (1958).
255. See id.; Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1971), cert.
denieg 409 U.S. 917 (1972).
256. 451 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 917 (1972).
257. Id. at 1182 (quoting California League of Independent Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 175 F. Supp. 857, 860 (N.D. Cal. 1959)) (emphasis added). See also Ohio v. Ohio Medical
Indem., Inc. [1976-2] TRADE CASES (CCH) T 61,128 (S.D. Ohio, Sept. 16, 1976).
258. See, e.g., Steingart v. Equitable Life Assurance Soe'y of the United States, 366 F. Supp.
790 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (state antitrust law, if applicable to insurance industry, may trigger McCarran-Ferguson Act). But see Ohio v. Ohio Medical Indem., Inc. [1976-2] TRADE CASES (CCH)
61,128, at 70,113 n.1 (S.D. Ohio, Sept. 16, 1976).
259. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408,431 (1946); Transnational Ins. Co. v.
Rusenlund, 261 F. Supp. 12 (D. Ore. 1966).
260. For a discussion of this kind of argument, see Note, supra note 240, at 1284-85.
261. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459-60 (1969). See Comment, supranote 249,
at 335-37.
262. See Note, 4pplicafions ofFederalAntitrustLaws to the InsuranceIndustry, 46 MINN. L.
Rnv. 1088, 1094 (1962).
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ture of the regulation, including its degree of effectiveness. 263
The final condition for McCarran-Ferguson protection is that the
challenged activity not be an agreement or act of "boycott, coercion, or
intimidation."' 2 4 In the face of generally ineffectual state regulation of
the insurance industry, 265 it may be tempting to read this "boycott exception" expansively and apply it to any anticompetitive behavior that
contains even remote elements of a boycott.266 To do so, however, runs
the risk of defeating the Act's basic purpose of giving states broad discretion over insurance regulation. It would seem appropriate then that
interpretation of the boycott exception be tempered by consideration of
this fundamental purpose.
For example, the district court in Professional& Business Men-s
Life Insurance Co. v. Bankers Life Co. 267 held that a complaint alleging
attempts by several insurers to "induce the general public from doing
business" with another insurer by means of false advertising stated
facts sufficient to show a secondary boycott and thus the court refused
to grant a motion to dismiss based on the McCarran-Ferguson Act.2 68
Such reasoning might be extended easily to characterize price discrimination, predatory pricing or any kind of exclusive dealing by insurers
as falling within the boycott exception to McCarran-Ferguson. However, such extension would be inappropriate in view of the Act's basic
rationale. Pricing activities by insurers clearly are part of the insurer's
rate-making function, and to treat these activities under the boycott exception would be to invade the states' discretion to regulate this function.
Significantly, the Third Circuit in Travelers Insurance rejected
such a broad reading of the boycott exception. Travelers had claimed
that Blue Cross was using reimbursement contracts with participating
hospitals to shift some costs from Blue Cross subscribers to other feepaying patients, including those covered by Travelers' policies. 269 This
263. Concerning the unclear nature of legislative intent on the issue of whether "state regula-

tion" was to mean effective regulation or merely any regulation, see id 1096 n.42. At the end of
World War II, when the MeCarran-Ferguson Act was passed, it was perhaps not implausible that
legislators could believe that relatively unregulated private cartel activities could be in the public
interest. After all, our highly productive wartime economy had been fueled in good measure by
big business with some aid from relaxed enforcement of antitrust laws. See, e.g., J. BLUM, V WAS
FOR VIcroRY 117-40 (1976).

264. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1976).
265.
266.
Boycott
267.
268.

See Note, supra note 240, at 1286-98.
See, e.g., Note, InsuranceRegulation andAntitrustExemptions: McCarran-Ferguson,the
Exception and the PublicInterest, 27 RUTGERs L. REv. 140, 158 (1973).
163 F. Supp. 274 (D. Mont. 1958).
Id at 281-83.

269. See text accompanying notes 132-34 supra.
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behavior may be viewed as an indirect form of predatory pricing by
Blue Cross. To avoid the McCarran-Ferguson defense, Travelers argued that Blue Cross had used its market power to "coerce" hospitals
into accepting these contracts, with the intended effect of attracting
subscribers from commercial plans to Blue Cross.27 The Third Circuit, however, held that this situation presented no evidence of boycott,
coercion or intimidation because of the "economic inducement" to hospitals to negotiate these contracts in order to keep a maximum number
of Blue Cross subscribers using the hospitals' facilities. 27 1 This narrower reading of the boycott exception can be reconciled with Professional & Business Men's Life by the fact that the pricing of hospital
services arguably has a closer relationship to an insurer's rate-making
function than does advertising.2 7 2 Nonetheless, Travelers' apparent
limitation of the boycott exception also seems more consistent with the
basic intent of the McCarran-Ferguson Act to grant states broad discretion in regulating the insurance industry.
The Travelers Insurance decision also helps support distinctions
that may be drawn between different kinds of exclusive dealing contracts that health insurers might use to lure customers away from
HMOs. In one case, an exclusive dealing contract simply might be
offered at a better price (because of larger group coverage and lower
administrative costs) than nonexclusive contracts. In this situation
there will be a clear "economic inducement" to customers and under
the reasoning of the Travelers decision the boycott exception shquld
not apply. In another case, only an exclusive dealing contract may be
offered although additional types of contracts might also have been offered by the insurer. In this situation customers may have an "economic inducement" to accept exclusive dealing contracts rather than
look elsewhere for insurance, but there is more of an element of bad
motive and use of force in this situation. Moreover, this kind of practice was among the acts of "boycott, intimidation, and coercion" that
were condemned in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association,273 the antitrust case that led to enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 4
270. 481 F.2d at 84.
271. Id. Without the contracts Blue Cross would provide only partial reimbursement to hospitals rendering services to Blue Cross subcribers, thereby making the hospitals less attractive.

Id. at 84 n.12.
272. In a recent case unfair advertising practices by an insurer were held not to be part of "the
business of insurance."

Center Ins. Agency, Inc. v.Byers, [1976-1] TRADE CAsEs (CCH)

1976).
(N.D. 111.
273. 322 U.S. 533, 535-36 (1944).
274. See Note, supra note 240, at 1275-77.
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The extensive nature of state regulation over health insurers suggests that the McCarran-Ferguson defense may be raised frequently to
defend anticompetitive behavior by insurers against HMOs. Every
state controls the organization (or admission to do business), financial
condition and policy forms of all health insurers.275 Every state also
has some form of unfair trade practices act that applies to all insurers. 276 Typically, this act enumerates and prohibits a variety of unfair
trade practices, including misleading advertising, unreasonable price
discrimination and "unfair methods of competition" as determined by
administrative action of the insurance department. 277 Many states regulate Blue Cross, Blue Shield and HMO plans under separate enabling
acts, but these statutes generally parallel the insurance law provisions
described above. 7" The most important difference among states' regulation of health insurance lies with the varying degree of rate regulation
that is imposed on different kinds of insurers. Enabling statutes for
Blue plans 79 and HMOs 80 generally provide for direct regulation of
insurance premiums under a "reasonableness" standard. On the other
hand, commercial insurers as well as Blue plans and HMOs regulated
under general insurance laws typically are not subject to direct rate regproulation, although over 20 states do attempt to ensure that benefits
28 1
premiums.
to
related
reasonably
are
vided by these insurers
How might this elaborate apparatus of state regulation and the
McCarran-Ferguson exemption be applied to the anticompetitive behavior of insurers against the HMOs? First, the refusal of Blue plans
to deal with HMOs or their physicians should satisfy the boycott exception to the Act.282 Also, exclusion of HMO physicians by Blue Shield
plans and Blue Cross refusals to provide marketing or administrative
services to HMOs may not fall within the scope of state regulation.
these restraints are not even part of "the business of insurArguably,
'283
ance.
275. See Hanson, supranote 241, at 697.
276. Id 698-99.
277. Note, supra note 240, at 1291. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. §§ 40-2403, -2404, -2406(a) (1973).
278. See Hanson, supra note 241, at 698; Kissam & Johnson, Slate HMO Laws 35.
279. See S. LAW, supranote 74, at 13-14.
280. See Kissam & Johnson, State HMO Laws 43-45, 53.
281. Hanson, supra note 241, at 698.
282. Cf. Medical Serv. Corp., [1976] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,195 (FTC Sept. 15,
1976) (consent decree obtained by the FTC against Blue Shield's exclusion of HMO physicians).
283. See id This certainly seems true if direct management services provided to HMOs are
not tied to the sale of reinsurance services. See note 249 supra. A closer question may be
presented as to whether Blue Shield's choice of participating physicians is related closely enough

to the insurer-insured relationship so as to make it part of "the business of insurance." Certainly
a decision to exclude HMO physicians qua HMO physicians would not seem to have any direct
adverse effect upon Blue Shield's premium rates. Blue Shield might argue, however, that limiting

Vol. 1978:4871

HEALTHMAINTENANCE ORG4NIZATIONS

535

Second, anticompetitive pricing against HMOs by other insurers,
including defensive HMOs, should qualify for McCarran-Ferguson
protection in most instances. Pricing of insurance policies certainly is
part of "the business of insurance." Although state regulation of insurance rates has something of a mixed character, direct rate regulation of
the Blues and HMOs typically is provided. These institutions are the
most likely offenders as they strive to protect or build substantial market shares in particular communities. 8 4 Finally, purchasers of policies
from an insurer engaged in anticompetitive pricing will have an "economic inducement" to buy at lower prices; under the Travelers
Insurance ruling this incentive should negate any finding of a "boycott" or "coercion!' by the insurer with the above noted exception of
certain exclusive dealing contracts.2 85
Third, the McCarran-Ferguson exemption would seem applicable
to defensive HMOs which are organized with an intent to exclude either other HMOs or potential competition between the parents of a
joint venture HMO. The strongest argument against applying the exemption would be that the organization of an HMO is antecedent to
the sale of insurance policies and thus not part of "the business of insurance." This argument draws some support from National
2 87
which
Securities28 6 and American General Insurance Co. v. FTC,
held, respectively, that the provision of information to prospective
shareholders and a merger between two interstate insurance companies
were not part of "the business of insurance." This argument is weakened, however, by the fact that the merger activities in those cases did
not in and of themselves increase the supply of insurance services. The
formation of a defensive HMO would increase the supply of services,
and this suggests a close similarity between HMO formation and the
insurer-insured relationship that the McCarran-Ferguson Act was
designed primarily to protect. 288 The organization of defensive HMOs
will be regulated by the states, 28 9 and this activity would not seem to
satisfy the moderate reading of the boycott exception that has been sugthe availability of Blue Shield-covered physicians in an area can limit overall costs on the theory
that physician supply generates its own demand. See, e.g., Havighurst, supranote 8, at 1156-60 &
n.56. Blue Shield also might argue that its choice of physicians is designed to protect subscribers

who rely on Blue Shield participation as an indication of a physician's quality. But neither of
these justifications is rationally served by decisions to exclude HMO physicians qua HMO physicians.

284. See text accompanying notes 178-80 supra.
285. See text accompanying notes 264-74 supra.
286. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).

287. 359 F. Supp. 887 (1973).
288. See SEC v. National See., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459-60 (1969).
289. See text accompanying notes 275-81 supra.
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gested above. 290
Finally, the application of McCarran-Ferguson to joint venture
HMOs that are restrained from competing with one of their parents
may depend on the nature of the restraint. If the restraint consists of a
failure to compete with an insurer parent for potential policyholders,
the challenged activity would seem to be part of "the business of
insurance" and not within the moderately read boycott exception.
Arguably, the decision of an HMO not to compete with its insurer parent may not be "regulated" or even "permitted" by the state in a manner that satisfies the third McCarran-Ferguson condition. The state's
antitrust law may not apply to the insurance industry,29 ' and the state's
unfair trade practices act might be deemed not to apply to this kind of
behavior.2 9 2 It also may be argued that neither of these types of laws
were intended by Congress to displace federal antitrust law with which
they are generally consistent,2 93 although this argument seems more
persuasive with respect to state antitrust laws that are not intended to
apply specifically to the insurance industry and are not administered by
the state insurance department. However, even under these different
situations a joint venture HMO might argue successfully that its decision not to compete was justified by considerations of financial soundness, a matter which clearly is subject to state insurance regulation.
A different situation will exist if the restraining parent is a medical
society and the restraint consists of decisions by the HMO to avoid cost
effective medical decisions such as selectivity in choosing specialists or
the use of paraprofessionals. These restraints would appear to be
neither the business of insurance 29 4 nor subject to state regulation, and
thus the McCarran-Ferguson exemption should not apply to this
case.

29 5

290. See text accompanying notes 264-74 supra.
291. See note 295 infra.
292. On the extreme fuzziness of states' unfair trade practices acts, see text accompanying
notes 276-77 supra.
293. See Weller, supra note 252.
294. The purchase or provision of medical services by an HMO is similar to the purchase of
hospital services by Blue Cross that was held to be part of the "business of insurance" in Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973). The arguable
differences between these two activities are the fact that the purchase or provision of medical

services will have less of a substantial impact on premium rates, see id at 82-83, and the fact that
"anticompetitive" provision of such services by a defensive HMO will in fact increase rather than
decrease premiums.
295. It should be noted that state antitrust law may be available in some cases as a technique
to avoid the McCarran-Ferguson exemption. See note 258 supra. However, statutory exemptions
from state antitrust laws frequently parallel federal exemptions. See Rubin, Rethinking State
Antitrust Enforcement, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 563, 614 (1974). For an application of Washington's
"little McCarran-Ferguson Act," see Washington Osteopathic Medical Ass'n v. King County
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6. Primary Jurisdiction and Implied Immunity Defenses. The
McCarran-Ferguson exemption generally may be sufficient to protect
296
the organization of defensive HMOs from federal antitrust scrutiny.

In addition, the existence of new federal regulation of HMOs suggests
that the "primary jurisdiction" and "implied immunity" doctrines of
antitrust law may be relevant to this issue.
A newly organized HMO will need to obtain a certificate-of-need
under the relevant provisions of the Health Planning and Resources
Development Act of 1974.297 It also may seek to qualify for benefits
provided to federally qualified HMOs under the Health Maintenance
Organization Act of 1973.298 These federal statutes establish "entry"
controls over HMOs ostensibly in order to promote both cost and quality of care reforms in the health care system. The former act and its
certificate-of-need provisions are designed to promote more efficient
methods of health care delivery, to prevent wasteful duplication of facilities, and, significantly, to improve the supply and distribution of
health care resources in underserved areas. 299 Similarly, the Health

Maintenance Organization Act is designed to promote HMOs not only
as a competitive force in the health market but also as a vehicle for
improving distribution of resources and providing more comprehensive
health insurance coverage to the public.3"
Under these statutes defensive HMOs could be approved by regulatory agencies in order to promote statutory objectives that are inconsistent with antitrust policy in a particular case. The existence of these
alternative regulatory tribunals and potentially conflicting statutory
objectives suggests that defensive HMOs may be able to raise both primary jurisdiction and implied immunity defenses to antitrust attacks
on their organization. The primary jurisdiction defense, which is procedural in nature, would seek to obtain a stay of the antitrust proceedings in order to allow a regulatory agency to assess facts and issues that
are relevant to the antitrust case but that are within the agency's special
Medical Soe'y, 78 Wash. 2d 577, 579-80, 478 P.2d 228,230 (1970). Furthermore, in the absence of
an explicit exemption, insurers may be able to argue that they are subject to a pervasive state
regulatory scheme that justifies an implied immunity from state antitrust law. Compare the arguments for an implied exemption from federal antitrust law. See generally Handler, Regulation
Versrus Corpetition, 44 U. CINN. L. REv. 191 (1975); Shuman, The Application a/the Antitrust
Laws to RegulatedIndustries,44 TENN. L. Rav. 1 (1976). See also text accompanying notes 309315 infra.

296. See text accompanying notes 286-90 supra.
297. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300m-2(a)(4)(B), -(2)(b)(2), 300n-1 (Supp. V 1975).
298. Id § 300e.

299. See id. §§ 300k, 300m-2(a)(4)(B), 300n-l(c).
300. See id §§ 300e to 300e-4; Kissam & Johnson, FederalHMO Laws 1203-12.
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competence. 30 1 The implied immunity doctrine is substantive and justifies an exemption from antitrust law for a regulated activity that is in
conflict with antitrust policy but "necessary" to promote the objectives
of the regulatory statute.3 °2
The primary jurisdiction doctrine seems particularly applicable to
two kinds of issues that might be raised in an antitrust attack on a defensive HMO.3 °3 Plaintiffs might assert either that insurers working
with their own peer review panel of physicians would be a less restrictive alternative to MCFs 3°4 or that both parents of a "joint venture"
HMO otherwise would be significant potential HMO entrants. 05 One
of the criteria that a certificate-of-need agency uses in assessing entry
applications is the "availability of alternative, less costly, or more effective methods of providing such services. ' 3° This suggests, in theory at
least, that a certificate-of-need agency is a more appropriate forum
than an antitrust court to assess the likely availability of less restrictive
alternatives or potential entrants. If this argument is sound, 0 7 a stay
of the antitrust proceedings would be justified to allow for a determination of these issues by the appropriate certificate-of-need agency. A
substantive result of this procedural decision might be the effective determination of the antitrust suit by a decision of a certificate-of-need
agency that is unduly influenced by fee-for-service interests. 0 8
The implied immunity defense to antitrust attacks on defensive
HMOs may be even more significant. The argument here is that application of antitrust law to defensive HMOs would defeat the purpose of
301. See Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
302. See United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 720-30 (1975); Silver
v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
303. The primary jurisdiction doctrine usually is, but need not be, asserted prior to a pending
or potential regulatory agency decision that will extend to the same activities before the antitrust

court.

See Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973).

Many antitrust attacks

against defensive HMOs might be brought after the HMO has received its regulatory approvals

because of the value of operational evidence, such as limited recruitment of subscribers or a failure to exploit available economics, in proving exclusionary intent or effect. Under the Riecidecision this still would not preclude an antitrust court from referring specific issues to the appropriate
certificate-of-need agency.
304. The basic competitive benefit of MCFs, lower costs from peer and utilization review by
and of physicians, might be obtained by the less restrictive alternative of independent health in-

surers working with their own panels of physicians. See Havighurst, HMOs 773-74.
305. In this case, creation of joint venture defensive HMOs may reduce competition in the

health insurance market by eliminating the possibility of independent entry of and subsequent
competition between the parent HMOs.

See generally Pitofsky, supra note 235.

306. 42 U.S.C. § 300n-l(c)(4) (Supp. V 1975).
307. But see Shuman, supra note 295, at 28-43, who argues that the primary jurisdiction doc-

trine has been misapplied to antitrust-regulated industry cases and that "[w]ith respect to antitrust
issues, agencies possess neither expertise nor superior fact-finding capability. In fact, the courts
are institutionally better suited for adjudicating antitrust issues than are the agencies."

Id. 39.

308. See Kissam & Johnson, FederalHlMO Laws 1219; Shuman, supra note 295, at 41.
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either or both of the aforementioned statutes, which is to promote various cost and quality of care reforms in a balanced manner. The courts
traditionally have relied so much on particular industry facts and regu9
latory provisions in deciding implied immunity cases 30 that one veteran observer has described the doctrine as a "tangled skein" and an
"impenetrable fog."'310 The lack of precedent relevant to the health
care industry makes it difficult to predict how antitrust courts would
resolve this issue.
Admittedly, several of the traditional indicia of implied immunity
from the antitrust laws are missing in this case. The relevant statutes
do not explicitly exempt any health care activities from antitrust law,
nor do they expressly direct regulatory agencies to take the antitrust
laws into account, although this might be inferred from the certificateof-need criterion quoted above 31 ' and the statutes' general emphasis
on cost reform.3 12 Additionally, the legislative history of both statutes
appears to be silent on the possible application of antitrust law to
health services entry.31 3 These considerations may not be decisive,
however, in view of the fact that both statutes were enacted before the
recent surge of interest in applying antitrust law to the health care industry, and well before the Rex Hospitaldecision 1 4 opened up the specific possibility of applying the Sherman Act to health care entry issues.
Moreover, with respect to entry issues, the comprehensive nature of the
regnew federal certificate-of-need law may well satisfy the "pervasive
315
immunity.
implied
an
justify
can
that
test
ulatory scheme"
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Article has surveyed the possible application of antitrust law
to a variety of devices that fee-for-service physicians and institutions
might employ to restrain the development of HMOs. Antitrust law
certainly is useful to protect HMOs from more egregious forms of anticompetitive behavior such as open boycotts against HMO physicians.
The body of antitrust law, however, contains a number of relevant defenses that seem capable of protecting unfair behavior toward HMOs
309. See L. SULLIVAN § 239.
310. See Handler, supra note 162, at 13-14.
311. See text accompanying note 306 supra.
312. See text accompanying notes 299-300 supra.
313. See, e.g., S. REP.No. 1285, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (reporting on S.2994, the Senate
version of the Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974); S.REP.No. 129, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (reporting on S.14, the Senate version of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973).
314. 428 U.S. 738 (1976).
315. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 384 U.S. 321, 352 (1973). For a discussion of the nature of this test as a slogan, see Handler, supra note 295, at 202.
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in many instances. Moreover, such behavior is possible and perhaps
likely in view of the particular nature of professional attitudes among
physicians and the complex economic and increasingly regulated nature of the health services industry.
One also may ask whether there are sufficiently strong political,
bureaucratic or economic incentives of public antitrust agencies and
HMOs to bring antitrust cases in the many difficult areas where such
cases may be appropriate. Some health services antitrust litigation,
such as that against price-fixing or group boycotts, may be both politically and economically attractive to public agencies and private plaintiffs. These kinds of cases probably are most easily understood by the
public as attacks against "evil," and they can serve an important symbolic function for politicians, communicating to the public a concern
for its general welfare.3 1 6 These cases also would seem to be of the
type most easily justified on a benefit/cost basis and thus attractive to
resource conscious policy planners in public agencies and to potential
private plaintiffs.
On the other hand, much antitrust litigation designed to protect
HMO interests may have to deal with more difficult and, to the public,
less easily understood issues such as restrictive hospital by-laws, NoerrPennington defenses, alleged price discrimination and defensive use of
HMOs. With regard to private suits, much of the unfair opposition
may be directed at relatively new and smaller HMOs that do not have
the economic resources to bring complex antitrust litigation. 31 7 Many
HMO administrators and physicians also may fear to be connected
with such litigation because of the close interrelationships among all
sectors of the medical economy and the potential for tarnished reputations from suits against fee-for-service interests. In sum, cautious realism about the value of antitrust law in protecting HMOs from unfair
restraints seems to be an appropriate attitude.
In this view, legislative change that effectively promotes HMOs
and competitive policies in the health care industry remains significant.
Although a relatively long list of desirable changes of this sort is available,31 s the political power of organized medicine and its fee-for-service allies can be counted on to continue to delay these changes. 319 It
316. On the symbolic role of antitrust regulation, see M. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF
POLmCS 22-43 (1964).

317. See Competitionin the Health Services Market,supranote 25, at 1584 (statement of John

w. Riley).
318. See, eg., authorities cited in note 8 supra.

319. See, e.g, Iglehart, Intense Lobbying Drive by Medical Group Dims Prospectsfor HlMO
Legislation, 1972 NAT'L J. 1404, 1405; Rosoff, Phase Two of the FederalHMO Development Program New DirectionsAfter a Shaky Start, 1 AM. J.L. & MED. 209, 210-14 (1975).
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thus may be advisable for HMOs and their allies to adopt a more selective legislative strategy. In this regard, two possible kinds of legislative
change may prove attractive. One change would be to repeal the application of the McCarran-Ferguson Act to the health insurance indus-

try, a move which seems eminently justified. 2° Such a proposal also

might obtain support as a result of the current mood for deregulation.
A second priority might be to encourage both federal and state
funding of medical school HMOs. These HMOs may not directly be
as significant a competitive force as others.3 21 Medical schools, however, seem to be likely sponsors of HMOs,3 22 and such HMOs could
serve an important educational purpose in changing the professional
attitudes of new generations of physicians. This policy would be consistent, moreover, with the apparently emerging "physician surplus"
that promises increased availability of newly trained physicians for new
forms of medical practice.32

320. It has been argued strongly that the entire McCarran-Ferguson Act should be repealed
or at least substantially modified. See, e.g., Note, supranote 240. See also FEDERAL STATE REGULATION OF THE PRICING AND MARKETING OF INSURANCE (P. W. MacAvoy ed. 1977). As strong as
these arguments are, however, the case for lifting health insurance from the Act's coverage seems
stronger. Quite simply, the Act's basic purpose of protecting horizontal restraints among insurers
to help maintain their financial solvency is irrelevant to the health care industry. This sector traditionally has not relied on cooperative rate-making bodies like other sectors of the insurance industry, Hanson, supra note 241, at 698, probably because of the different nature of the insurable
event, early domination of the industry by the Blues, and the incidental nature of health insurance
for multi-service commercial carriers. See J. KRIZAY & A. WILSON, supra note 19, at 39-40. Repeal of McCarran-Ferguson for health insurance still would leave insurers with a Parkerdefense
in some cases of closely state regulated activities, but under the modem interpretation of Parker,
see text at notes 150-77, this would seem to be a better accommodation between regulation and
competition concerns.
321. The interest of such an HMO arguably would be educational, rather than economic.
322. See, e.g., Physician TrainingFacilitiesand Health Maintenance Organizations:Hearings
Before the Subcomn on Health of the Senate Comm on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 935, S
703, S. 837,S. 1182, S, 1301, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 483-505 (1971) (statement of Robert M. Heyssel,
M.D., executive director, Ass'n of American Medical Colleges).
323. See Katz, Warner & Whittington, The Supply ofPhysicians and Physicians' Incomes:
Some Projections,2 J. HEALTH POL., POL'y & L. 227 (1977).

